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QUALIFIED SOVEREIGNTY
Kate Sablosky Elengold* and Jonathan D. Glater**
Abstract: Sometimes acts of the federal government cause harm; sometimes acts of
contractors hired by the federal government cause harm. In cases involving the latter, federal
contractors often invoke the sovereign’s constitutionally granted and doctrinally expanded
supremacy to restrict avenues for the injured to recover even from private actors. In prior work,
we analyzed how federal contractors exploit three “sovereign shield” defenses—preemption,
derivative sovereign immunity, and derivative intergovernmental immunity—to evade
liability, accountability, and oversight.
This Article considers whether, when, and how private federal contractors should be held
accountable in a court of law. We argue that a contractor should be required to qualify before
it can derive the immunity enjoyed by its sovereign partner. This Article proposes that a private
contractor be entitled to such “qualified sovereignty” contingent on satisfying three conditions:
(1) it was acting as the government’s agent, (2) it complied with any guidelines established by
the government, and (3) it was reasonable for the contractor to believe that its conduct would
not violate rights protected by law. Adopting scaffolding from two embattled doctrinal
constructs—derivative sovereign immunity and qualified immunity—qualified sovereignty
balances the rights of victims to recover for harms with protection for private entities from
unforeseen liability incurred at the government’s explicit and lawful direction.
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INTRODUCTION
Private businesses supply, support, and act on behalf of the United
States federal government across numerous and diverse domains and
correspondingly can lay claim to the sovereign’s exceptional defenses to
liability for harm they cause. These defenses block claims in widely
divergent contexts because contractors provide myriad services, from
fighting wars,1 to operating prisons2 and detention centers,3 to managing
a $1.6 trillion portfolio of student loans.4 This Article proposes limits on
the availability of these defenses. This outsourcing is not particularly new,
but its modern scope and consequences5 raise important questions about
the application of the longstanding legal doctrines that determine when
those harmed by government action, or action taken on behalf of the
government, may recover damages for the injury.6
Federal contractors’ conduct can and does cause harm.7 Contractors
1. CONG. BUDGET OFF., PUB. NO. 3053, CONTRACTOR’S SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 1
(2008),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/08-12-iraq
contractors.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS7X-6EPK] (“CBO estimates that as of early 2008 at least 190,000
contractor personnel, including subcontractors, were working on U.S.-funded contracts in the Iraq
theater.”). These contractors have not been limited to ancillary roles. Andrew Finkelman, Suing the
Hired Guns: An Analysis of Two Federal Defenses to Tort Lawsuits Against Military Contractors, 34
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 395, 401–02 (2009) (noting that “[a]lthough military regulations prohibit
contractors from performing inherently governmental functions, including combat operations, reality
has not conformed to this rule”).
2. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
3. GEO Grp., Inc. v. Newsom, 15 F.4th 919 (9th Cir. 2021).
4. Pennsylvania v. Navient Corp., 967 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2020); Kate Sablosky Elengold & Jonathan
D. Glater, The Sovereign Shield, 73 STAN. L. REV. 969, 1010–11 (2021) [hereinafter Sovereign
Shield].
5. JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 15 (2017) (observing that “[w]hile it is true that private and commercialized actors carrying
out State responsibilities have been around since before the Founding, any comparison between those
folks and the ones we encounter today is entirely inapt”).
6. See Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 980–94 (describing the interplay of three powerful
doctrines that together may protect federal actors from civil liability and other forms of accountability
and oversight).
7. See, e.g., Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1143 (S.D. Cal. 2018)
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operating federal prisons have been charged with failing to protect the
health of prisoners in the midst of a raging pandemic;8 contractors
operating detention centers have been charged with failing to keep track
of children and parents separated at the border;9 contractors providing
military equipment have been charged with knowingly manufacturing and
selling defective battlefield flares to the United States Army and Air
Force;10 contractors for the Department of Energy were charged with the
improper handling and disposal of radioactive waste at a plant in
Kentucky;11 and government officials issued a report documenting
“repeated cases of procurement fraud, kickbacks, and misuse of taxpayer
funds” in Pentagon contracts.12
When the federal government performs such tasks—and causes such
harms—itself, it enjoys extensive and powerful immunity to a wide
variety of claims brought by victims of its negligent or intentional
activities.13 Unless expressly waived by Congress, the federal
government, as supreme sovereign, enjoys the protection of three distinct
but related doctrines—sovereign immunity, intergovernmental immunity,
and preemption—which we have previously termed the “sovereign
shield.”14

(order granting preliminary injunction) (finding that federal policy of separating parents and children
at the United States border may violate the federal constitution).
8. See, e.g., Gayle v. Meade, No. 20-21553-CIV, 2020 WL 3041326 (S.D. Fla. June 6, 2020)
(discussing immigration detainees at three detention centers, two of which were run by contractors,
alleging that their confinement violated government COVID protocols).
9. Family Separation, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/our-issues/immigrantjustice/family-separation [https://perma.cc/LU7B-A8WP] (describing the complaints that the
organization has filed on behalf of separated migrant families, including those who were
“scatter[ed] . . . among a network of facilities run by private contractors under the federal Office of
Refugee Resettlement (ORR), while their parents [were] locked up in rural, isolated ICE facilities”).
10. Complaint, United States ex rel. Dye v. ATK Launch Sys., Inc., No. 06-cv-00039 (D. Utah
Nov. 2, 2007).
11. First Amended Complaint, United States ex rel. Boegh v. Bechtel Jacobs Co., No. 02-cv-00300
(W.D. Ky. Apr. 8, 2008).
12. Press Release, Off. of Congressman Peter DeFazio, Harkin and Defazio Release List of Fraud
Cases
Among
Top
100
Pentagon
Contractors
(June
7,
2000),
http://s3.amazonaws.com/fcmd/documents/documents/000/000/474/original/harkindefazio.pdf?1423
019028 [https://perma.cc/JM54-5WHG].
13. To be sure, federal legislation explicitly permits recovery in specified circumstances. A prime
example is the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671–2680. The FTCA,
discussed infra at section I.A, permits a person to sue the federal government for the following:
[I]njury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
14. See Sovereign Shield, supra note 4.
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Federal contractors, as agents of the federal government, may also lay
claim to derivative protection of the sovereign shield.15 When successful
in invoking this perquisite of the sovereign, contractors leave citizens
without recourse for harms suffered. This has occurred when, for
example, individuals have claimed harm due to a contractor’s eviction of
a resident of public housing,16 a contractor’s provision of health care
services in a prison,17 and a contractor’s investigation of a firefighter’s
suspicious absenteeism.18
In previous work, we have examined the contours of each of the three
sovereign shield doctrines and the ways contractors purposely confuse
and conflate them to create a powerful barrier against liability and
oversight.19 We called attention to how an expansive sovereign shield
creates an “alliance of Goliaths” between private sector contractors and
the federal executive branch.20 We revealed how that alliance undermines
constitutional principles of federalism and separation of powers.21 And,
most importantly, we showed how application of the sovereign shield
leaves injured plaintiffs without a remedy.22
This Article offers a novel solution to the sovereign shield problem.
We argue that a federal contractor’s access to these powerful doctrines to
avoid liability should be contingent—that a federal contractor must
qualify for such protection.23 When a contractor should have known that
its conduct on behalf of the federal government would violate rights of the
plaintiff that are protected by law, it should not qualify for sovereign
shield protection. In other words, the contractor would bear the burden of

15. Id. at 980–84 (arguing that federal contractors take advantage of the incoherent doctrinal
understanding of the sovereign shield doctrines to extend their protection to cover conduct undertaken
by private actors).
16. Meadows v. Rockford Hous. Auth., 861 F.3d 672, 677–78 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding that private
security contractor was entitled to qualified immunity defense because its employees acted “under the
direct supervision of [Housing Authority] officials when they carried out the actions that [the plaintiff]
challenges”).
17. Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the private
contractor would be entitled to qualified immunity “unless the constitutional violation was caused by
an unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation itself” and that “[r]espondeat superior
liability does not apply to private corporations” (emphasis in original)).
18. Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 389 (2012) (finding that a private lawyer investigating on
behalf of a public entity was entitled to qualified immunity because “immunity . . . should not vary
depending on whether an individual working for the government does so as a full-time employee, or
on some other basis”).
19. See Sovereign Shield, supra note 4.
20. Id. at 1030–32.
21. Id. at 1041–46.
22. Id. at 1038–41.
23. See infra Part II.
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establishing that the failure to anticipate a legal violation was reasonable
on the facts available and given the terms of the contract.24 If the
contractor could not bear that burden, the contractor would be susceptible
to monetary damages. Our proposal borrows from two embattled
doctrines: derivative sovereign immunity and qualified immunity. Taking
them together, we propose that a federal contractor qualify to derive the
protections of its sovereign contracting partner only when (1) the
contractor was acting as the government’s agent, (2) the contractor
complied with any guidelines established by the government, and (3) it
was reasonable for the contractor to believe that its conduct would not
violate legal rights.
We previously argued that these sovereign shield defenses—federal
preemption of state law, sovereign immunity, and intergovernmental
immunity—should be available only when the contested action is
noncommercial, opening both the government and its private contractors
up to legal liability for harms caused by commercial conduct.25 The
normative case for recognizing forms of federal sovereign immunity is
weaker when (1) the government—directly or indirectly through
contractors—provides a service that is not uniquely public, meaning that
other, nongovernmental entities offer a similar service and (2) the
government’s activity is more akin to commercial conduct.26 On the other
24. See infra section II.B for a discussion of reasonableness.
25. See generally Kate Sablosky Elengold & Jonathan D. Glater, The Sovereign in Commerce, 73
STAN. L. REV. 1101 (2021) [hereinafter Sovereign in Commerce]. This is an application of the
doctrine of respondeat superior, or what we have previously labeled “upstream liability,” where both
the contractor agent and the federal principal are liable for the acts of the contractor. Id. at 1147–48.
We recognize that the Justices have not endorsed drawing a distinction between commercial and
noncommercial conduct in the context of immunity, yet we see opportunity still in the Court’s
doctrine. In fact, a majority of the Supreme Court declined to recognize a distinction between states’
commercial and noncommercial activities in the course of rejecting an argument that participation in
a federal program that explicitly allowed for suit against the state necessarily entailed abrogation of
state sovereign immunity. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666 (1999). The majority found that the state of Florida had not consented to suit in federal court by
participation in the federal program, id. at 676, and that the fact that the federal program involved
commercial activity did not matter, id. at 684 (“[T]he constitutionally grounded principle of state
sovereign immunity is [not] any less robust where, as here, the asserted basis for constructive waiver
is conduct that the State realistically could choose to abandon, that is undertaken for profit, that is
traditionally performed by private citizens and corporations, and that otherwise resembles the
behavior of ‘market participants.’”). However, the dominant concern of the College Savings majority
was that immunity could not be waived implicitly, by participating in the government program; the
Justices’ discussion of the weight to be accorded to a commercial/noncommercial distinction was
limited to that context. That is, participation in commercial conduct could not sustain the argument
that by doing so, a state implicitly surrendered its sovereign immunity. Id. Further, in support of our
argument that the Court should recognize the commercial/noncommercial distinction in the sovereign
shield context, we identify several doctrinal contexts in which it has already made that distinction.
Sovereign in Commerce, supra, at 1129–42.
26. See generally Sovereign in Commerce, supra note 25.
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hand, when the federal government—directly or indirectly through
contractors—provides a beneficial public service that otherwise would be
(1) unavailable, (2) available on unacceptable terms, or (3) available with
unacceptable consequences, then the normative case for some form of
federal sovereign immunity is more compelling.27 Were our full proposal
to be implemented, then the qualified sovereignty proposal in this Article
would only apply to noncommercial conduct. It is not necessary, however,
to
adopt
our
full
project
proposal,
including
the
commercial/noncommercial distinction, to agree with the qualified
sovereignty construct proposed herein. Rather, qualified sovereignty
could be adopted and applied to all actions undertaken by a private actor
on behalf of the federal government. By holding private contractors liable
for violating an individual’s legal rights, qualified sovereignty strikes a
careful balance. Unlike our earlier calls to abolish both sovereign
immunity and its derivations when the alleged bad action is commercial,28
here we do not advocate for a complete ban on sovereign immunity, even
for private companies acting pursuant to a contract with the federal
government.
One reason for that choice is an interest in consistency. Our proposal
closes the accountability gap between government actors and their private
contractors, when engaged in the same activity. In that way, it gives
credence to an intuition about fairness—an agent following orders that are
neither illegal nor unfair themselves should not be held liable when the
principal is not. And it closes the accountability gap between private actors
and private contractors, treating private contractors more like any other
actor in the private sector. Another reason for that choice is efficiency in
government action. Our proposal balances the rights of victims to recover
for harms with protection for private entities from unforeseen liability

27. In such instances, weighing the potential public benefits against the potential costs of the
harmful conduct to the individual presents a political question. The federal legislature may determine
that the aggregate value of the service to the public means it should be undertaken despite the risk of
harm. Examples include providing for the national defense, which is both costly and inherently risky,
see, e.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 1986) (“It should be axiomatic that
‘considerations of cost, time of production, risks to participants, risks to third parties, and any other
factors that might weigh on the decisions of whether, when, and how to use a particular weapon, are
uniquely questions for the military and are exempt from review by civilian courts.’” (quoting In re
Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1054 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1982))); Hazel Glenn Beh,
The Government Contractor Defense: When Do Governmental Interests Justify Excusing a
Manufacturer’s Liability for Defective Products?, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 430, 443 (1997) (“Judicial
deference to military and national-defense decisions is well-rooted in judicial opinions.”); engaging
in criminal law enforcement, which only the government has the authority to do; or operating carceral
facilities, which would itself constitute a crime if performed by individuals at their own discretion, 18
U.S.C. § 1201(a)–(d) (making kidnapping illegal).
28. Sovereign in Commerce, supra note 25.
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incurred at the government’s explicit and lawful direction. If government
contractors never derived the sovereign protections of their contracting
partner, government contracts would be less efficient and more expensive.
Rather, by holding government contractors accountable only for a
reasonably foreseeable violation of legal rights, both the contractor and
the government agency are incentivized to enter contracts and implement
them in thoughtful and lawful ways.
The discussion that follows has three Parts. Part I explains how current
law governs when and under what circumstances an injured person can
seek relief from the government or its contractors. This Part explores three
paths to remedy harmful conduct by the federal government and its
agents—a Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) claim,29 a Bivens claim,30
and a state law tort claim. Adopting the perspective of the plaintiff, this
Part shows how victims seeking monetary damages against the federal
government or government agents must run a similar gauntlet, whichever
of the three legal mechanisms is used. It further illuminates how the
doctrines allow private contractor agents to escape without accountability.
Part II develops the “qualified sovereignty” construct, borrowing from
derivative sovereign immunity and qualified immunity. It argues that, if a
contractor cannot qualify for sovereign shield protection, it should not
receive such protection. In that case, any action against the contractor
would avoid the hurdles of the FTCA, Bivens, and sovereign shields as
applied to state law.
To make the theoretical concrete, Part III then turns to the case of
Ammend v. Bioport, Inc.,31 wherein a group of several dozen former
military personnel, along with their families, sued for damages related to
their receipt of an anthrax vaccine (“AVA”), directed by the United States
Department of Defense and produced and implemented by private
companies under contract with the federal government. The first section
of Part III applies the qualified sovereignty construct to the facts and
procedure of this case.
The final section of Part III is for readers of our trilogy of Articles,32
which comprehensively identify, dissect, and propose related solutions to
the understudied phenomenon of contractors evading accountability by
using the sovereign shield. The final section explores the process a court
would follow to determine how the defendants in the Ammend case would
have to approach their sovereign shield defenses if a court adopted both
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2).
30. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). For
a more detailed analysis, see infra section I.B.
31. 322 F. Supp. 2d 848 (W.D. Mich. 2004).
32. See Sovereign Shield, supra note 4; Sovereign in Commerce, supra note 25.
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our commercial/noncommercial protocol and our qualified sovereignty
construct. A brief conclusion follows.
I.

CURRENT LAW—FEDERAL CONTRACTORS AND
AVOIDANCE OF LIABILITY

When a plaintiff is injured by a government contractor, acting under
the guidance and direction of the federal government, the plaintiff has
three primary avenues to seek money damages.33 One avenue is to try to
hold the United States liable for the contractor agent’s actions in federal
court pursuant to the process and law of the Federal Tort Claims Act.34
Under another avenue, the plaintiff can seek to hold the contractor agent
directly responsible in federal court pursuant to the implied remedy of
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics
(“Bivens”).35 Finally, the plaintiff can seek to hold the contractor agent
responsible by bringing an action alleging violations of state tort law in
state court.36 All three of those avenues require the plaintiff to run a
procedural gauntlet in which the government contractor can (often
successfully) seek to avoid legal accountability. Under current law,
federal contractors may avoid liability by invoking the sovereign shield or
exploiting gaps in federal actor accountability.
To understand how the current law operates, it is necessary to set out
how these three avenues apply to both government officials and
government contractors. This Part both sets the stage for the remainder of
the Article and contributes to the literature by explaining the procedural

33. See Danielle C. Jefferis, Delegating Care, Evading Review: The Federal Tort Claims Act and
Access to Medical Care in Federal Private Prisons, 80 LA. L. REV. 37, 40–41 (2019) (noting that a
federal prisoner can bring a constitutional claim against the government only through the FTCA or
Bivens, explaining that “the availability of those claims is exceedingly narrow”). An injured plaintiff
may also have other statutory remedies, wherein Congress has waived sovereign immunity. See
Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477, 480 (2011)
(“There are three basic sources of liability under federal law for government officials or entities
alleged to have violated substantive legal principles: 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of
action against state actors for violations of the Constitution; liability pursuant to Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which implies a cause of action for damages
against federal officials for certain violations of the Constitution; and statutory causes of action, which
specifically provide causes of action against government officials or their entities, such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act.”); Sarah L. Brinton, Three-Dimensional Sovereign Immunity, 54
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 237, 249 (2014) (citing three of “Congress’s most important statutory waiver
creations: (1) the U.S. Court of Claims and the Tucker Act; (2) the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA);
and (3) the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)”).
34. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671.
35. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
36. For example, the plaintiff in Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), alleged
violations of Virginia tort law.
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hurdles that plaintiffs confront in bringing any of these claims. This Part
shows how the FTCA and Bivens claims create parallel procedural
processes, from the plaintiff’s perspective, that make it exceedingly
difficult to get monetary damages. It then explains how the remaining
avenue to recovery—state law—is the most vulnerable to sovereign shield
defenses, which stop plaintiffs in their tracks. In the end, plaintiffs are left
with limited ability to recover from federal actors and even more limited
ability to recover from private actors acting under the guidance and
direction of the federal government.
A.

Federal Tort Claims Act and Its Procedural Hurdles

The Federal Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity of the United
States for certain torts committed by federal employees acting within the
scope of their employment.37 The law illustrates that, notwithstanding the
power of federal sovereign immunity,38 Congress retains the power to
waive, or abrogate, that immunity.39 In cases involving allegations of
constitutional and non-constitutional torts caused by federal action,
Congress has waived federal immunity through the FTCA40 and, over
decades, courts have extensively refined the scope of liability.41 In an
FTCA action, plaintiffs confront two sets of procedural hurdles that they
must clear to avoid getting kicked out of court on immunity grounds. The
plaintiff must first overcome sovereign immunity, satisfying the
requirements of the FTCA, and then must avoid the Act’s exceptions that
restore immunity. Although the defendant bears the burden of proving that
an FTCA exception applies, both the Supreme Court and lower courts
have been generous to the government in their interpretations of the law

37. Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 740, 745 (2021).
38. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”); Mark C. Niles, “Nothing but
Mischief”: The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV.
1275, 1287–91 (2002) (explaining the adoption of federal sovereign immunity in the United States).
39. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (explaining that Congress can waive federal sovereign
immunity to monetary damages, but the waiver must be “unequivocally expressed in statutory text”
and “strictly construed . . . in favor of the sovereign”); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)
(explaining that the United States may waive its sovereign immunity to suit, but such a waiver must
be “unequivocally expressed”). But see Gregory C. Sisk, The Continuing Drift of Federal Sovereign
Immunity Jurisprudence, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 522 (2008) (arguing that, in recent decades,
the Supreme Court has been less rigid in “considering the nature and extent of liability by the
government”).
40. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671.
41. See, e.g., infra section I.B.2 (discussing Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997)).
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for some time.42
1.

FTCA Accountability—Government Employees

The FTCA, passed in 1946, permits civil claims against the federal
government for federal statutory or constitutional violations.43 In other
words, the FTCA provides a process through which a tort victim can seek
relief against a federal employee who would otherwise be immune.44
More specifically, the FTCA gives federal district courts exclusive
jurisdiction to hear “claims against the United States, for money
damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment,” where, under similar circumstances, the United States, if a
private person, would be liable under the law applicable in the place where
the injury occurred.45
This sovereign immunity waiver applies only in certain circumstances
and in accord with a particular protocol. Under the FTCA scheme, if a
plaintiff sues a federal employee, either the Attorney General or a federal
district court must “certify” that the employee was acting within the scope
of their employment.46 When government employees do not act within the
scope of their employment, the FTCA does not apply, and a plaintiff may
sue the employees directly.47
Once the Attorney General or federal judge has certified that a federal
employee defendant had been acting “within the scope of his office or
employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose,” the
42. See Niles, supra note 38, at 1300–01 (explaining the exceptions to the FTCA and noting that
“the discretionary function restriction is stated in broad terms, has resulted in a substantial limitation
on the liability of the United States in a wide range of circumstances, and has fostered a substantial
jurisprudence”).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (conferring on federal district courts “exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred”).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(3).
47. A corporate defendant might well prefer that the FTCA apply; the structure of the Act creates
an incentive for the contractor and its employing agency together to argue that the FTCA dictates the
availability of any remedy. This is an example of the same kind of incentive we explored in Sovereign
Shield, in that the government principal has no disincentive to help its contractor agent take advantage
of federal supremacy to avoid potential liability, and the contractor has every reason to do exactly
that. Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 1038–46.
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United States is substituted as a party in the employee’s place.48 At that
point, the FTCA is triggered, the suit is “deemed an action against the
United States,”49 the court dismisses the individual employee and
substitutes the United States as a defendant,50 and the case proceeds
against the United States in federal court.51 The structure of the FTCA
thus protects individual government employees from liability,52 regardless
of the outcome of the action against the United States.53 The plaintiff must
exhaust their administrative remedies before an FTCA case can be heard
in federal district court.54 FTCA claims are not subject to the Seventh
Amendment’s jury requirement.55
Once a complaint is filed in federal court, the FTCA’s requirements,
exceptions, and defenses apply. The FTCA’s immunity waiver is subject
to statutory limits, in the form of exceptions, which attach as soon as the
government’s employee is certified.56 One of the frequently used and
powerful exceptions is the “discretionary function exception,” which
excepts “any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation . . . or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty.”57 This means that if
a government employee is entrusted with a degree of discretion, victims
of harms caused by the employee’s exercise of that discretion may have
no remedy; the underlying idea is that the government should not be
subject to judicial “‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative
decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the
medium of an action in tort.”58 Courts and advocates have argued that this
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d).
49. Id. § 2679(d)(1).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 2679(d)(2).
52. Id. § 2679(b)(1) (making the suit against the United States “exclusive of any other civil action
or proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject matter against the employee whose
act or omission gave rise to the claim or against the estate of such employee”).
53. And, if the plaintiff originally brings a state law claim against the employee, the Westfall Act
allows the Attorney General to certify the employee and the claim converts into an FTCA claim.
Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413, 416 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); id. § 2675(a) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2402.
56. The exceptions to the immunity waiver were designed to protect the government from extensive
financial risk while at the same time encouraging the government to maximize public benefit rather
than to try to minimize risk. KEVIN M. LEWIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45732, THE FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT (FTCA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW 2 (2019).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
58. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797,
814 (1984).
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exception is so expansive that it essentially swallows the original
immunity waiver.59
The discretionary function exception is not the only statutory limitation
on the FTCA’s immunity waiver. The FTCA bars suits against the
government in more than a dozen categories of cases, including certain
claims “arising from the actions of law enforcement officers
administering customs and excise laws,”60 “certain claims predicated
upon intentional torts committed by federal employees,”61 and “[a]ny
claim arising in a foreign country.”62 Of particular salience at the time of
writing, in the midst of the raging COVID-19 global pandemic, is the
FTCA exemption for “[a]ny claim for damages caused by the imposition
or establishment of a quarantine by the United States.”63 Although there
are compelling rationales for some or all of these exceptions, their net
effect is to limit a waiver of sovereign immunity that would otherwise
provide a remedy to plaintiffs injured (and sometimes gravely injured) by
government conduct.64
This complex statutory structure can leave an injured plaintiff without
any remedy. If, for example, the government employee who caused injury
was acting within the scope of their employment when they harmed the
plaintiff but the United States is protected by an FTCA exception, the
injured plaintiff is left without any recourse against either the government
or its employee.65 This liability escape hatch protects both employee and
employer and creates an incentive to certify when the government is likely
to find safety in one of the many broad exceptions to the FTCA’s
immunity waiver.

59. See, e.g., Matthews v. United States, No. C07-00030, 2011 WL 3471140, at *2 (D. Guam Aug.
5, 2011) (describing “the discretionary function exception” as “the most frequently litigated” statutory
exception to the FTCA), aff’d, 586 F. App’x 366 (9th Cir. 2014); James R. Levine, The Federal Tort
Claims Act: A Proposal for Institutional Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1541 (2000) (similar).
60. LEWIS, supra note 56, at 16 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)).
61. Id. at 17 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k).
63. Id. § 2680(f).
64. See, e.g., Foster Logging, Inc. v. United States, 973 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that
the FTCA exception barred action by logging company for damages caused by the Army forestry
division’s alleged failure to observe, monitor, and maintain a controlled burn); see also Willett v.
United States, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1167 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (holding that the plaintiff’s FTCA action against
the United States for injuries she sustained when she was alleged sexually assaulted by a VA hospital
employee were dismissed pursuant to the discretionary function exception).
65. See B & A Marine Co. v. Am. Foreign Shipping Co., 23 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994); see also
Bannum, Inc. v. Samuels, 221 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.D.C. 2016). The plaintiff is also left without remedy
if they do not meet the stringent procedural requirements of the FTCA, including exhausting
administrative remedies. See Harris v. Wilson, 282 F. Supp. 3d 80 (2017) (holding that the FTCA
applied, but the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies barred her from proceeding).
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FTCA Accountability—Government Contractors

Although the FTCA waives federal sovereign immunity only for acts
committed by United States employees66 and explicitly exempts
independent contractors from the definition of employee,67 the
determination of who can be held liable under what circumstances is
considerably more complex than that clear-sounding description implies.
The statute defines “[e]mployee of the government” to include “persons
acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity.”68 And courts
in some circumstances have determined that non-employee, private
individuals are federal employees for purposes of the FTCA. Consistent
with agency principles regularly invoked in sovereign immunity cases,69
in distinguishing employees from independent contractors, the reviewing
court’s inquiry focuses on the degree of control exercised by the United
States.70 For the contractor to be considered an employee, the federal
government must have supervised the contractor’s day-to-day operations
or had control over the contractor’s physical performance.71 More
specifically, courts assess whether the contractor, rather than the
government, exercised day-to-day supervision and control of its own
activities.72 This leaves plaintiffs injured by federal contractors uncertain

66. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
67. Id. § 2671; U.S. Tobacco Coop. Inc. v. Big S. Wholesale of Va., LLC, 899 F.3d 236, 248 (4th
Cir. 2018) (“An ‘employee’ does not include an ‘independent contractor’ working for the
government.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2671; United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976))); see
Jefferis, supra note 33, at 42 (“Increasingly, however, the federal government attempts to evade its
own duty of care owed to people in its custody by invoking the FTCA’s independent-contractor
exception.”).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2671.
69. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940); Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at
986–92; Jefferis, supra note 33, at 53 (“Courts’ application of the FTCA’s independent-contractor
exception generally tracks common law principles of principal-agent relationships.”).
70. Del Valle v. Sanchez, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1264–65 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (identifying that “the
determining factor” as to whether a party is an employee or an independent contractor is “the level of
control exercised by the federal government over the individual or agency” (citing Orleans, 425 U.S.
at 814)).
71. Id.; Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, When Is Federal Agency Employee Independent Contractor,
Creating Exception to United States Waiver of Immunity Under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.
§ 2671), 166 A.L.R. Fed. 187 (2021) (originally published in 2000).
72. Orleans, 425 U.S. at 814 (“A critical element in distinguishing an agency from a contractor is
the power of the Federal Government ‘to control the detailed physical performance of the contractor.’”
(quoting Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 528 (1973))); id. at 815 (holding that independent
contractor status under the FTCA turns on “whether [the contractor’s] day-to-day operations are
supervised by the Federal Government”); see also Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 307 (4th
Cir. 1995) (finding independent contractor status based on “a comprehensive instrument providing
that [the contractor] was responsible for the maintenance of the Premises” and “the daily operations
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whether they can seek relief through the FTCA.
Consider two contrasting examples. In Bird v. United States,73 the
Tenth Circuit found that a nurse anesthetist qualified as an employee
under the FTCA because he did not have broad discretion to exercise his
independent judgment.74 Rather, the court found that the nurse anesthetist
worked under the supervision and control of an operating surgeon who
was an employee of the federal government.75 The FTCA procedure then
kicked in—the United States was substituted for the nurse anesthetist as
defendant, leaving him free from individual liability.76 The United States
then could seek the protection of the FTCA’s immunity waiver
exceptions.
On the other hand, in Robb v. United States,77 the court found that
physicians who provided medical services at facilities operated by the
federal government worked relatively independently of the federal
government’s control and therefore qualified as independent contractors
for FTCA purposes.78 The court noted that the doctors who failed to
diagnose a cancerous lesion on the plaintiff’s lung were employed by a
private entity hired by the U.S. Air Force.79 The reviewing court also
concluded that: (1) nothing in the contract between that entity and the Air
Force showed an intention to make the doctors employees of the federal

of the Premises”); Larsen v. Empresas El Yunque, Inc., 812 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that
the independent contractor defense applied where responsible party ran the “day-to-day operation of
[a] restaurant” that was located on premises “owned and controlled by the United States”).
73. 949 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1991).
74. Id.; see also Bannum, Inc. v. Samuels, 221 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding that claims
against a Bureau of Prisons contractor were covered by the FTCA, the United States was the only
proper defendant, and that the FTCA failed because the plaintiffs did not exhaust remedies and an
FTCA exception applied); Omnipol v. Worrell, 421 F. Supp. 3d 1321 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (contracting
officers were considered employees under the FTCA, but the action was dismissed pursuant to federal
sovereign immunity).
75. See Bird, 949 F.2d at 1086 (“Nurse Bullon was not a physician bound to exercise his judgment
independently of a government supervisor. He was not only subject to the rules and regulations and,
indeed, a statute placing him under the control and supervision of physician employees of the hospital,
but he was under their actual control to the extent they chose to exercise it. He was required to work
with patients designated by others. He maintained no separate office. He used hospital equipment
exclusively. He could see patients in no other place nor under any other circumstance than as directed
by government employees. He was under the control and supervision of the government surgeon at
the hospital to the same extent that nurse Forsythe, a regular employee of the government, was.”).
76. Id. at 1088 (finding that the nurse anesthetist “was an employee of the government and not an
independent contractor within the contemplation of the FTCA” and remanding to the lower court to
apply the FTCA).
77. 80 F.3d 884 (4th Cir. 1996).
78. Id. at 890; see also Creel v. United States, 598 F.3d 210, 212 (5th Cir. 2010).
79. Robb, 80 F.3d at 893.
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government,80 and (2) the government did not control the daily activities
of the doctors to an extent that they could be deemed employees.81
Because the contractor doctors were not considered employees, the FTCA
was not triggered, and the injured plaintiff could sue the contractor
directly in state or federal court.82 Nevertheless, the defendant contractor
would not be, at that point, prohibited from invoking sovereign shield
defenses
(preemption,
derivative
sovereign
immunity,
or
intergovernmental immunity) in that state or federal litigation.83
To review and consolidate a confusing process, we set out three
possible scenarios where a plaintiff seeks to recover monetary damages
related to harm caused by a government contractor via the FTCA. Each
has a different outcome.
In the first scenario, the contractor is certified as a federal employee,
thus subjecting the claim to the FTCA. Imagine that, in this scenario, none
of the FTCA waiver exceptions apply and the federal government may be
liable directly for the underlying tort. Neither the contractor nor the
contractor’s employee—under the doctrine of respondeat superior—is
subject to direct liability, and the injured plaintiff can recover monetary
damages only from the United States. This possibility creates an incentive
for a contractor to argue that it is an employee, operating under extensive
federal control and with minimal discretion or autonomy.
In the second scenario, the contractor’s employee is certified as a
federal employee, thus triggering the FTCA. In this second scenario,
however, imagine that one of the FTCA’s exceptions to the immunity
waiver applies or that the federal government is otherwise relieved of
liability under the FTCA. Because the FTCA is triggered, the individual
who committed the challenged action cannot be held liable, nor can their
contractor employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior.84 And
because an exception to the immunity waiver applies, the United States
may assert sovereign immunity, protecting the federal government itself
from liability.85 Consequently, the injured plaintiff is left with no avenue
for redress. The outcome of this second scenario incentivizes, reinforces,
80. Id. at 891.
81. Id. at 892.
82. Id. at 890.
83. See Sovereign Shield, supra note 4; see also infra section I.C.
84. Note, however, that the dismissal is often without prejudice, in case the United States
“subsequently withdraws the certification.” See Roemen v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1007
(D.S.D. 2020).
85. See, e.g., Bannum, Inc. v. Samuels, 221 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding that claims
against a Bureau of Prisons contractor were covered by the FTCA, the United States was the only
proper defendant, and that the FTCA failed both because the plaintiffs did not exhaust remedies and
an FTCA exception applied).
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and strengthens the alliance between the government agency and its
contractor because, by working together, both entities escape
accountability. We have previously defined and critiqued this
relationship.86
In the third scenario, the contractor’s employee is not certified as a
federal employee. Therefore, the FTCA does not apply at all. In this
scenario, the plaintiff would not be able to sue the federal government but
would be able to assert claims against the contractor employee responsible
for the injury and against the contractor itself via respondeat superior. In
that action, however, the contractor could still seek the protection of the
sovereign shield.87 Even if a derivative sovereign immunity defense is
unavailable because the contractor is not an employee, the contractor can
nevertheless assert preemption of applicable state law and/or
intergovernmental immunity to try to avoid liability. For example, in
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,88 sometimes considered a derivative
sovereign immunity case itself,89 the United States Supreme Court found
that because the contractor enjoyed significant discretion in its operations,
it was not an employee but an independent contractor, and consequently
the FTCA did not apply. The contractor was still able to escape liability
for the death of a United States Marine, however, by relying on conflict
preemption.90 Boyle offers an example of successful invocation of the
86. See Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 977. In fact, understanding the practical implications,
many plaintiffs challenge the certification of an employee as within the scope of the employment. See
LEWIS, supra note 56, at 14. With respect to these first two scenarios, we have also previously argued
that, if the original harmful activity was commercial, neither the federal government nor its contractor
agent should be able to escape liability by resorting to a sovereign shield defense, including sovereign
immunity. If courts were to adopt our suggestion, then, for commercial activities, neither the
government nor its contractor would be able to assert sovereign immunity, rendering the FTCA—and
its exceptions—irrelevant. See Sovereign in Commerce, supra note 25, at 1142–52. Therefore,
depending on the challenged action and traditional agency principles, the plaintiff could seek relief
from the contractor employee, the contractor company, and the federal government principal.
However, even if the courts or Congress were to adopt our proposal for commercial conduct, the
FTCA applies in many situations involving conduct that would be deemed noncommercial, see id.,
leaving the outcomes in the above scenarios intact and allowing the employee and their contractor
employer to escape from liability.
87. See Cabalce v. VSE Corp., 914 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1159 (D. Haw. 2012) (granting United States’
motion to dismiss claims arising under the FTCA for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the
plaintiff was injured by federal contractors’ actions); Cabalce v. VSE Corp., 922 F. Supp. 2d 1113,
1123–27 (D. Haw. 2013) (affirming the rejection of defendant’s assertions that it was not subject to
state law tort action because of sovereign shield defenses, including preemption and derivative
sovereign immunity).
88. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
89. See Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 980.
90. Boyle, 487 U.S. 500; see also Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1336–37 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“The imposition of such liability on the manufacturers of the Aegis would create a duty of care where
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sovereign shield by a contractor—using one, two, three, or an undefined
mix of doctrines—to avoid accountability. This outcome not only
forecloses recovery for injured plaintiffs, but also may produce the bizarre
result that a federal contractor has broader immunity from liability than
the federal government does itself.91 Regardless, this analysis shows that
when the FTCA does apply, the exceptions to the general waiver extend
generously to private actors under contract with the federal government.92
As alternate arguments that both protect contractors, the FTCA’s
procedure and sovereign shield protections can leave plaintiffs injured by
a private government contractor without means of redress.
B.

Bivens, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Procedural Hurdles

In 1871, Congress provided for abrogation of states’ immunity, in
language now codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983,93 which subjects any person
acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage[] of any State or Territory” to liability94 for “deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws”
inflicted on “any . . . person” within the jurisdiction of the United States.95
The Court has extensively assessed the scope and implications of
remedies under § 1983 for defendants who are natural persons.96 States
retain their Eleventh Amendment immunity, notwithstanding § 1983.97
The Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics98 took a step toward providing a similar path
to recovery to that provided by § 1983 for plaintiffs alleging that federal

the combatant activities exception is intended to ensure that none exists. Accordingly, preemption is
appropriate.”).
91. That is, if the federal government had been the defendant in Boyle, the FTCA would have
provided a path to (limited, to be sure) liability; the federal government, itself the sovereign, would
be statutorily precluded from asserting the immunity that United Technologies, the contractor,
asserted in Boyle. But see Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1328 (also dismissing claims against the United States
pursuant to the FTCA’s exceptions).
92. See infra notes 215–226 and accompanying text (chronicling the lack of accountability for
private contractors of the federal government who assert sovereign shield defenses in civil litigation).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
94. In law (i.e., for damages) or equity (injunctive or other relief). Id.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (concluding that “[l]ocal
governing bodies . . . can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief
where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s
officers”).
97. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343–44 (1979).
98. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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agents violated a right protected by the U.S. Constitution.99 Thereafter, the
Court’s extensive § 1983 jurisprudence has been applied to Bivens actions
as well.100 Relatedly, the Court’s creation and application of “qualified
immunity” to protect state government officials from liability under
§ 1983 applies to a Bivens defendant if he did not know and should not
have known that his actions violated the plaintiff’s federally-protected
right.101
While § 1983 and Bivens have different origins, they follow a similar
procedural and substantive path, which is not unlike the one we described
with respect to the FTCA. The plaintiff must first overcome sovereign
immunity, satisfy the requirements of Bivens, and then must overcome a
qualified immunity defense. Like the exceptions to the FTCA, the judgecreated construct of qualified immunity has been thoroughly excoriated
by critics, who argue that Bivens’ power to hold government actors liable
for injuries has been wholly stymied by qualified immunity,102 leaving the
plaintiff without access to relief. In addition, the procedure for holding a
contractor liable under Bivens suffers from the same loopholes as the
FTCA. If, for example, a federal contractor was acting within the scope
of its contract and under the direction of the federal agency, it can escape
liability in the loophole between a Bivens claim, which cannot lie against
a private actor,103 and a state tort action, in which the defendant can assert
derivative sovereign immunity, or some other doctrinal component of the
sovereign shield.104 The liability loophole protects both the contractor and
the federal government.105

99. Id.
100. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675–76 (2009) (“In the limited settings where Bivens
does apply, the implied cause of action is the ‘federal analog to suits brought against state officials
under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.’” (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2
(2006))).
101. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506–07 (1978); id. at 504 (“Accordingly, without
congressional directions to the contrary, we deem it untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of
immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly
under the Constitution against federal officials.”).
102. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 933,
936–37 (2019) (explaining the history of government liability in three historical phases that have
become progressively more hostile to permitting monetary relief against the government and its
officials).
103. See infra notes 158–166 and accompanying text (discussing Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118
(2012) and its holding).
104. See infra notes 181–189 and accompanying text (describing the ways that contractors can use
the sovereign shield doctrines to avoid liability under state law).
105. See Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 1034–38.
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Potential Liability—Government Actors

42 U.S.C. § 1983 affords a monetary damages remedy when a state
actor’s conduct violates a federally protected right.106 Regularly, civil
rights plaintiffs use § 1983 to seek relief against state actors for violations
of their constitutional and other federal rights, such as the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against imposition of “cruel and unusual
punishment[]”107 or the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.108 The Supreme Court has explained
that § 1983 protects “federally guaranteed rights” and is enforceable
against “[a]nyone whose conduct is ‘fairly attributable to the State.’”109
Prisoners in state facilities turn to § 1983 when harmed by abusive
guards,110 for example, and victims of racial profiling at the hands of state
law enforcement officers use § 1983 to seek to vindicate their rights.111
While a plaintiff may seek relief from the individual state actor, such
as a municipality, that caused the harm, and in some cases may seek relief
from the defendant state actor’s supervisor,112 the same plaintiff cannot
necessarily seek relief against the entity that employs the bad actor.
Rather, whether a plaintiff can sue the responsible entity depends on the
kind of analysis the Court undertook in a 1978 case, Monell v. Department
of Social Services.113 In Monell, women sought back pay after being
required to take unpaid leaves of absence while pregnant, before such
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
109. Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 937 (1982)).
110. See, e.g., Green v. Padilla, 484 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (D.N.M. 2020) (addressing section 1983
action by prisoners in state correctional facility alleging abusive conduct by guards).
111. See, e.g., Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386 (S.D. Miss. 2020) (addressing
section 1983 action by Black motorist stopped and detained by police officer).
112. See, e.g., Green, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 1165 (Plaintiff “plausibly alleges that [supervisor]
subjectively was aware that [prison guard] was prone to abuse inmates; she expressly alleges that
[prison guard] was placed on leave for improper relationships with female inmates, and that
[supervisor] was aware of this pattern of impropriety”).
113. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Court concluded that a “local government may not be sued under
§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents [and that] [i]nstead, it is when
execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as
an entity is responsible.” Id. at 694; see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 676–77 (1974)
(distinguishing between claims against the state and its officers and stating that “[t]hough a § 1983
action may be instituted by public aid recipients such as [plaintiff], a federal court’s remedial power,
consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief . . . and
may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury”
(emphasis added)). The Court reaffirmed this distinction in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341
(1979).
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leaves were considered medically necessary.114 Whether anyone—and
who—actually pays any damages awarded is also complicated.
Government entities like municipalities may indemnify the state officials
responsible for the harm when they are successfully sued under § 1983,115
but a successful plaintiff may nonetheless be blocked by
Eleventh Amendment immunity in any effort to recover from a state116 or
from “local government units . . . considered part of the State for
Eleventh Amendment purposes.”117
When an individual, natural person causes harm while acting in an
official capacity on behalf of the federal government, rather than on behalf
of a state, Bivens comes into play: the Supreme Court has recognized a
non-statutorily-created path for a victim to recover from individual federal
agents118 that operates similarly to § 1983’s state sovereign immunity
waiver.119 In Bivens, which involved an allegedly unconstitutional search
and seizure, the Court declared that a victim who “can demonstrate an
injury consequent upon the violation by federal agents of [the victim’s]
Fourth Amendment rights . . . is entitled to redress [the] injury through a
particular remedial mechanism normally available in the federal
courts.”120 The Court grounded its newly-created theory of liability on the

114. Monell, 436 U.S. at 661.
115. Id. at 713 n.9 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Austin v. Niblick, 626 Fed. App’x 167, 170–
71 (7th Cir. 2015) (analyzing municipal and state law indemnification provisions in case involving
successful § 1983 claim).
116. See, e.g., Laufman v. Elliston, 116 Fed. App’x. 88, 89 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that if the
successful plaintiff in a § 1983 action “has any viable claim against the State of Arizona under the
indemnification statute (a matter on which we express no opinion), he must pursue that claim in the
state court system”); see also Edelman, 415 U.S. at 675–77 (rejecting argument that “§ 1983 was
intended to create a waiver of a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity merely because an action
could be brought under that section against state officers, rather than against the State itself”).
117. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.54.
118. I.e., recovery is available from the individual people acting on behalf of the federal
government, not from the government itself. See, e.g., Reinbold v. Evers, 187 F.3d 348, 355 n.7 (4th
Cir. 1999) (“Bivens does not allow for recovery of money damages, or suits in general, against the
government itself.”).
119. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994) (declining to recognize a cause of action under
Bivens against a federal agency, rather than just a federal agent, because the rationale for Bivens
recovery is “to deter the [federal] officer” (emphasis in original)). Nor is a Bivens action possible
when the defendant is a corporate entity acting on behalf of the federal government. Corr. Servs. Corp.
v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71–72 (2001) (reasoning that it would be asymmetrical to permit a plaintiff
to recover against a private corporation because a “federal prisoner in a [federal Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”)] facility alleg[ing] a constitutional deprivation . . . may bring a Bivens claim against the
offending individual officer, subject to the defense of qualified immunity[,] [but] [t]he prisoner may
not bring a Bivens claim against the officer’s employer, the United States, or the BOP”).
120. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
The plaintiff sought, and the Supreme Court allowed for, money damages from each of the agents of
the federal government who carried out the search. Id. at 388–89.
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understanding that a violation of the Fourth Amendment, which
“guarantees to citizens of the United States the absolute right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures carried out by virtue of federal
authority,”121 must be remediable. Having found a violation of a federally
protected right, the Court declared, “it has been the rule from the
beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant
the necessary relief.”122
Since the creation of the remedy in 1971, however, the Supreme Court
has grown more and more reluctant to expand the universe of potential
Bivens actions.123 As Justice Breyer observed, in rejecting a Bivens claim
resting on the Eighth Amendment, the Court “has had to decide in several
different instances whether to imply a Bivens action” and “in each instance
it has decided against the existence of such an action.”124 The Court
refused to recognize a Bivens claim brought by undocumented immigrants
detained by the federal government in the wake of the September 11,
2001, terror attacks, who challenged the detention as violative of their
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.125 The Court declined to allow a
Bivens cause of action in the wake of a fatal, cross-border shooting by a
United States Border Patrol officer of a youth in Mexico.126 And the Court
rejected a Bivens claim where a landowner alleged that Bureau of Land
Management (“BLM”) employees extorted the landowner to force him to
grant an easement over his property.127 In each case, the Justices expressed
considerable concern about expanding the availability of a Bivens-type
remedy to a new context. Lower court opinions abound, citing to such
Supreme Court cases, prohibiting Bivens claims from proceeding.128

121. Id. at 392.
122. Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
123. Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 124 (2012).
124. Id.
125. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857, 1860 (2017) (listing various additional
cases in which the Court has declined to create an implied damages remedy).
126. Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. __,140 S. Ct. 735, 749–50 (2020).
127. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 560–62 (2007); see also Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring
the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 809, 812 (“Precisely because Bivens was a matter of judicial implication, . . . the Court retains
and has exercised the power to limit the extent of any Bivens remedy, consistently restricting the reach
of Bivens from 1980 on.”).
128. See, e.g., White v. True, No. 19-CV-0418, 2019 WL 3074528, at *2–3 (S.D. Ill. July 15, 2019)
(finding that an inmate’s allegations that the correctional officers’ refusal to allow him to write his
daughter letters violated his First Amendment rights did not create a valid Bivens action); Williams
v. O’Donnell, No. 19-CV-00418, 2020 WL 6686416, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 12, 2020) (noting that the
“Supreme Court has declined to extend the right of action implied in Bivens to permit individuals to
bring claims against federal agencies for damages arising from violation of the individual’s
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Even if a court permits a Bivens action to proceed, the plaintiff is not
entitled to get to the merits of the action without clearing a second
procedural hurdle—overcoming a claim of qualified immunity. In the
same way that the FTCA exceptions swallow the initial immunity
waiver,129 critics compellingly argue that qualified immunity makes the
remedy provided by § 1983 and Bivens available in theory but not in
practice.130
The qualified immunity doctrine, critics contend, is imprecisely and
misleadingly named. Although the Supreme Court has characterized the
immunity for individual defendants in a § 1983 or Bivens action as
“qualified” rather than total, the effect is absolute: if qualified immunity
applies, it fully shields a defendant from suit. There are no gradations of
immunity once a court invokes qualified immunity. One of the goals of
the doctrine—for no statute establishes the parameters or criteria for this
particular executive armor—is to enable government defendants to avoid
the “burdens of broad-reaching discovery”;131 thus, qualified immunity
inhibits a claimant’s ability to even gather evidence or move on to the
merits of a claim.132
In Butz v. Economou,133 the Court explained that federal executive
branch officials enjoy qualified immunity in suits alleging violations of
constitutional rights, like state officials confronting § 1983 claims.134 The
Court rejected the federal government’s assertion that unconditional, or
absolute, immunity should protect federal actors.135 A few years later, the
Court described the two-step test that had to be satisfied by an official
asserting qualified immunity, explaining that “government officials
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

constitutional rights” in plaintiff’s claims against the FBI and others); Harris v. Dunbar, No. 17-cv00536, 2018 WL 3574736, at *4 (S.D. Ind. July 25, 2018) (dismissing plaintiff’s First and
Fifth Amendment challenges under Bivens).
129. See supra note 59.
130. See generally Karen Blum, Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity
Developments: Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REV. 633 (2013) (noting the ways in
which qualified immunity has become a quasi-absolute bar on recovery for plaintiffs injured by
federal contractors).
131. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
132. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (explaining that a “defendant pleading
qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery”).
133. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
134. Id. at 500.
135. Id. at 498.
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would have known.”136 In articulating this formulation, the Court sought
to obviate the need for burdensome fact investigation of subjective
intent.137 Instead, upon motion by a defendant, a court would consider two
seemingly objective questions: whether the defendant official’s alleged
conduct138 violated a right (a) that was clearly established and (b) of which
a reasonable person would have known. The Court subsequently held that
trial courts have discretion to choose the order in which to address these
questions.139
As the Court’s qualified immunity doctrine developed over roughly
fifty years, the “clearly established” prong of the test has become its
defining factor. Because instances of official conduct giving rise to either
a § 1983 or Bivens claim inevitably differ in their particulars, a defendant
can successfully contend that the plaintiff’s right to be free of harms
caused by such conduct had not been clearly established by a prior judicial
decision.140 The Court’s decisions have ensured that the bar a defendant
official must clear in order to obtain immunity is low: an official need
persuade a reviewing court only that the conduct undertaken did not
violate rules that were clearly established at the time, and the Supreme
Court has further explained that this means that officials are entitled to
this protection unless the officials are “plainly incompetent” or knowingly
committing acts in violation of law.141 Numerous commentators have
criticized this immunity doctrine, arguing that the Supreme Court has
made it far too easy for state actors to qualify.142
136. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
137. Id. at 816–18.
138. Of course, if the defendant disputes the allegations, resolving the seemingly objective
questions becomes considerably more challenging in the absence of discovery. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 673 (2009) (observing, in weighing whether lower court’s denial of qualified immunity
constituted immediately appealable decision, that “whether a particular complaint sufficiently alleges
a clearly established violation of law cannot be decided in isolation from the facts pleaded”).
139. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). This represented a shift; the Court previously
had instructed lower courts to assess whether a right was violated first, then determine whether the
right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The move in Pearson gave
trial court judges more leeway to choose whatever order would resolve litigation sooner, an outcome
consistent with the goal of minimizing the burden of litigation on government official defendants.
Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 17 (2017).
140. See Blum et al., supra note 130, at 652 (arguing that to satisfy the “clearly established” prong,
the Court demanded a “pertinent Supreme Court or controlling circuit court decision or a consensus
of persuasive authority from other circuits”).
141. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866–67 (2017).
142. Schwartz, supra note 139, at 6–7 nn.5–7 (listing scholarly works critical of qualified immunity
doctrine). Recently, even the Supreme Court has taken a step toward reining in the doctrine,
emphasizing that a plaintiff need not identify a case with identical facts in order to establish that a
right allegedly violated was “clearly established.” Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53–
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Empirical research on the effects of the doctrine, however, offers a
quantitative rebuttal to the notion that qualified immunity has undermined
the availability of remedies under § 1983 and Bivens.143 Professor Joanna
C. Schwartz, in a large-scale empirical study of § 1983 civil rights cases,
found that “contrary to judicial and scholarly assumptions, qualified
immunity is rarely the formal reason that civil rights damages actions
against law enforcement end.”144 In fact, Schwartz concludes that across
the five districts included in her study of almost 2,000 lawsuits, “just 3.9%
of the cases in which qualified immunity could be raised were dismissed
on qualified immunity grounds.”145 Professor Alexander A. Reinert, who
undertook an earlier and similar study of the effect of qualified immunity
in Bivens actions, came to a similar conclusion.146 Professor Reinert
recognizes the almost universally held belief that Bivens plaintiffs find
relatively little success in large part because of the federal actors’ access
to qualified immunity,147 but empirically shows that “the availability of
qualified immunity plays a limited role in Bivens failures.”148
That is not to say, however, that the empirical studies are supportive of
qualified immunity as it has been implemented by the courts. Even those
scholars remain unconvinced that qualified immunity achieves its stated
goals.149 Because qualified immunity may still operate to discourage
potential claimants or their lawyers from bringing meritorious suits,150 or
54 (2020) (per curiam) (stating that “no reasonable correctional officer could have concluded that,
under the extreme circumstances of this case, [the challenged conduct] was constitutionally
permissible” even if it had not been precisely identified in prior case and quoting United States v.
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) for the principle that “a general constitutional rule already identified
in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question”).
143. Schwartz, supra note 139; Reinert, supra note 127, at 813 (concluding that “Bivens cases are
much more successful than has been assumed by the legal community, and that in some respects they
are nearly as successful as other kinds of challenges to governmental misconduct”).
144. Schwartz, supra note 139, at 9.
145. Id. at 10.
146. Reinert, supra note 127, at 851.
147. Id. at 812.
148. Id. at 813. In fact, Reinert finds that “success rates for Bivens suits range from 16% to more
than 40%, which is at least an order of magnitude greater than has previously been estimated.” Id. In
a review of hundreds of filed cases making Bivens claims, Reinert found that “[d]ismissal on the
merits, for frivolity, and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies were the most common
grounds for terminating a case.” Id. at 843.
149. Id. at 843–44; see also Schwartz, supra note 139, at 48 (finding, for example, that in a sample
of 1,183 cases, official defendants raised a qualified immunity defense in only 13.9% of cases in
which the defense was available); Reinert, supra note 127, at 847 (“It seems beyond dispute, for
instance, that a system of formal governmental liability would vindicate interests in full
compensation.”).
150. Reinert, supra note 33, at 477 (arguing that, although qualified immunity plays less of a role
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may encourage quick settlements,151 Professor Schwartz concludes that
the “available evidence suggests that qualified immunity may make it
more difficult for plaintiffs to secure representation and may encourage
plaintiffs to settle, [although] it is infrequently the formal reason that cases
end.”152 Put slightly differently, while Professor Schwartz voices criticism
of the effects of qualified immunity on substantive outcomes, she does not
believe those effects are the result of the doctrine’s formal application to
filed cases.
2.

Potential Liability—Federal Contractors

Injured people may prosecute § 1983 claims against nongovernmental
entities, such as contractors, acting on behalf of state or local government.
For example, a prisoner at a state correctional facility in Tennessee could
bring a § 1983 lawsuit for injuries allegedly inflicted by guards who were
employees of the private corporation operating the prison on behalf of the
state.153 Similarly, a firefighter alleging violations of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments by a private attorney hired by the city to
investigate the firefighter’s absenteeism, could rely on § 1983.154 It did
not matter in that case, Filarsky v. Delia,155 that the lawyer was not an
employee.
However, when someone is injured by a nongovernmental entity, such
as a contractor, acting on behalf of the federal government, Bivens may
not provide a path to relief.156 In other words, unlike the Tennessee state
prisoner,157 a federal prisoner injured by a guard who was employed by a
private company under contract with the federal government has no

in the success of a filed case than imagined, “lawyers often take qualified immunity into account at
the case-screening stage and indeed may in some cases avoid litigation in which qualified immunity
is even a potential issue”); Schwartz, supra note 139, at 51 (noting that evidence suggests that the
qualified immunity doctrine “may make it more difficult for plaintiffs to secure representation”).
151. Schwartz, supra note 139, at 51.
152. Id.
153. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 401–02 (1997).
154. Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 382 (2012).
155. 566 U.S. 377 (2012).
156. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (holding that Bivens did not confer a right
of action on a federal inmate claiming that a private prison operating a halfway house under contract
with the federal Bureau of Prisons violated his Eighth Amendment rights); Minneci v. Pollard, 565
U.S. 118, 125–26 (2012). Under such facts, the Court held, the plaintiff could (and had to) avail
himself of a state tort law remedy against the employee. Minneci, 565 U.S. at 125–26. And even if a
plaintiff may file a Bivens action against an individual, government official, that official still may
assert a qualified immunity defense. Thus, the Bivens action is not a tool “for altering an entity’s
policy” but is a deterrent to the individual only. Corr. Servs. Corp., 534 U.S. at 74.
157. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 401–02.
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Bivens claim against the individual guard, his contractor employer, or the
federal government. The Court reached this flat conclusion in Minneci v.
Pollard,158 a 2012 case brought by a prisoner in a federal facility operated
by a private company.159 In Minneci, the plaintiff charged that prison
officers had violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.160 The majority reasoned that the “Eighth Amendment claim
focuses upon a kind of conduct that typically falls within the scope of
traditional state tort law” and consequently there was no need to apply the
“freestanding” damages action enabled by Bivens.161 Justice Breyer
deemed it “critical” that the defendant officers sued in Minneci were
employees of a private company, not the federal government: “[T]he
potential existence of an adequate ‘alternative, existing process’ differs
dramatically in the two sets of cases,” Breyer wrote, because “[p]risoners
ordinarily cannot bring state-law tort actions against employees of the
Federal Government.”162 The majority’s reasoning is instructive; it
recognizes that the purpose of Bivens was to provide a path to potential
recovery in the absence of explicit, federal legislation.163 Rather than
extend Bivens to private companies under contract with the federal
government, the Court deemed that state tort law provided a sufficient
remedy.164 But the potential for contractors to rely on the sovereign shield
to avoid state liability creates a Catch-22. This is similar to the Catch-22
faced by plaintiffs seeking to hold contractors liable under the FTCA.
Private actors—even those under contract with the federal government—
cannot be held liable under Bivens because state tort law ostensibly
provides sufficient incentives to protect victims’ rights against private
actors.165 Such an analysis ignores that the federal contractor—in the state
court action—could raise sovereign shield defenses, thus avoiding

158. 565 U.S. 118 (2012).
159. Id. at 120.
160. Id. at 122.
161. Id. at 125–26.
162. Id. at 126 (emphasis omitted).
163. Id. at 123.
164. Id. at 130. In Minneci, the Court recognized that there could be no such similar state court
action against a federal employee. Under the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2679(b)(1), were a
federal employee the defendant in an action under state tort law, the federal government itself would
be substituted for that employee. See Minneci, 565 U.S. at 126.
165. See Minneci, 565 U.S. at 130 (“[I]n principle, the question is whether, in general, state tort
law remedies provide roughly similar incentives for potential defendants to comply with the Eighth
Amendment while also providing roughly similar compensation to victims of violations. The features
of the two kinds of actions just mentioned suggest that, in practice, the answer to this question is
‘yes.’”).
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liability and foreclosing any remedy for the plaintiff.166
How does the notion of qualified immunity apply to contractors in this
structure? One version of the question arose in Richardson v. McKnight,167
the Tennessee prison case referenced above. In Richardson, the Supreme
Court weighed a § 1983 claim by a prisoner in a state correctional facility
operated by a contractor. The plaintiff alleged that prison guards violated
his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
by “subjecting him to tight restraints during his transport to another
prison.”168 The guards asserted a qualified immunity defense, but the trial
court judge disagreed,169 as did an appellate panel that considered the
question on an interlocutory appeal.170 In affirming its rejection of the
qualified immunity defense, the majority of the Court emphasized the
incentive that marketplace competition creates for private actors to act
aggressively—an incentive that public actors lack.171 A significant
justification of qualified immunity is countering potential governmental
“timidity”172 that the threat of liability might create, so in the absence of
such timidity, there was no need for protection from liability.173 The
majority went on to note that a private sector employer need not dangle
the prospect of immunity to lure talented employees because it can
provide insurance and higher wages to offset any liability risk,174 and in
any event, the “risk of ‘distraction’ [by litigation] alone cannot be
sufficient grounds for immunity.”175
Although both the Supreme Court and lower courts have applied
qualified immunity to private contractors in § 1983 litigation,176 the
166. See infra section I.C. However, Professor Alexander A. Reinert and Professor Lumen N.
Mulligan argue persuasively that Minneci should be understood in narrower terms as precluding a
Bivens claim only to the extent that state tort law provided an equivalent and adequate remedy.
Alexander A. Reinert & Lumen N. Mulligan, Asking the First Question: Reframing Bivens After
Minneci, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1473, 1500 (2013) (criticizing the Court for “assert[ing] that the
existence of alternative state-law remedies illustrated that Bivens was inapt”).
167. 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
168. McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417, 418 (6th Cir. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Richardson v. McKnight,
521 U.S. 399 (1997).
169. Id. at 419.
170. Id. at 425.
171. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 408–09.
172. Id. at 409.
173. Id. at 410.
174. Id. at 411.
175. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
176. See Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 394 (2012) (overturning a Ninth Circuit decision holding
that a private attorney contracted by the city was not entitled to seek the protection of qualified
immunity); Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 251 (5th Cir. 2018) (allowing privately employed
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approach in Richardson seems palatable. It allows the plaintiff to proceed
in a § 1983 litigation against the private contractor without facing a
qualified immunity challenge. However, the same problem that we have
been facing throughout the course of our overall project still arises—
private companies under contract with the federal government are able to
skirt, avoid, and escape liability under current doctrine. That is because
§ 1983 does not apply to federal contractors. Rather, a plaintiff would
have to turn to a Bivens claim. But the Court, having concluded that a
Bivens action is not available,177 stops the claim in its tracks before even
reaching the question of whether a private contractor employee is entitled
to qualified immunity.
C.

State Tort Action and Its Procedural Hurdles

If a plaintiff is prohibited from bringing a claim for violation of a
federal or constitutional right, pursuant to the FTCA, Bivens, or another
statutory immunity waiver, then that plaintiff can only turn to state tort
law for a remedy. Of course, the plaintiff will be barred from suing the
federal government itself on the grounds of sovereign immunity. The
question, then, is whether the plaintiff can sue a federal government
contractor—a private company acting pursuant to a contract with the
federal government—under state law. This is, after all, what the Court
envisioned when it closed off Bivens actions against private entities in
Minneci.178 Based on our prior in-depth analysis of the ways in which
private entities under contract with the federal government use and abuse
sovereign shield defenses,179 especially with respect to state law claims,
to avoid liability,180 we contend that this is not a sufficient option.
That is because there is nothing stopping a defendant federal contractor,
sued under state law, from asserting that it is not subject to liability
because it is entitled to the benefits of derivative sovereign immunity,
intergovernmental immunity, and/or preemption.181 Derivative sovereign

psychiatrist defendants who were not directly employed by the state to raise the defense of qualified
immunity); Meadows v. Rockford Hous. Auth., 861 F.3d 672, 677–78 (7th Cir. 2017) (allowing
privately employed security defendants, under contract with the state Housing Authority, to assert a
qualified immunity defense).
177. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001); accord Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118
(2012).
178. Minneci, 565 U.S. at 125.
179. See Sovereign Shield, supra note 4.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504–13 (1988) (finding that “civil
liabilities arising out of the performance of federal procurement contracts” are among certain areas of
law involving “uniquely federal interests” that require preemption of state law).
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immunity is a mechanism by which a federal agent or instrumentality can
derive the benefits of the sovereign’s immunity under either traditional
agency principles or under traditional preemption analysis. The former
traces its roots to Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co.,182 and the latter
is articulated in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.183 Intergovernmental
immunity traces its origin to McCulloch v. Maryland,184 and prohibits
states from discriminating against or regulating the federal government.185
In its derivative form, private contractors can seek to claim the benefits of
intergovernmental immunity by arguing that, by regulating the private
entity, the state is, in effect, regulating or discriminating against the
federal government.186 Federal preemption of state law rests on the
protections of the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution,187 has
been developed into multiple forms through the Court’s jurisprudence,
and preference for federal law where there is a conflict between state and
federal law.188 In addition to traditional preemption claims, contractors
regularly assert that the federal contracts themselves provide the
necessary preemptive power to avoid liability under state law.189
That a contractor could avoid liability in this way is not simply a
theoretical possibility. In Smith v. International SOS Assistance, Inc.,190
for example, the court specifically noted that, while the FTCA did not
“provide . . . a blanket extension of sovereign tort immunity to persons
acting at the government’s behest,”191 courts have recognized “two
defenses that contractors may raise in order to argue that the government’s
sovereign immunity shields them from tort suit.”192 Those two defenses
were Boyle’s “government contractor defense” and Yearsley’s “derivative

182. 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
183. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). For an extensive analysis of derivative sovereign immunity, including
Yearsley and Boyle, see Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 986–92.
184. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
185. Id. at 425, 436 (holding that Congress has the power to incorporate a national bank and that a
state cannot constitutionally tax its branches).
186. See, e.g., Student Loan Servicing All. v. District of Columbia, 351 F. Supp. 3d 26, 72–75
(D.D.C. 2018) (plaintiff student loan servicing organization alleged that the District of Columbia’s
effort to regulate student loan servicers—private entities under contract with the federal
government—in the District violated intergovernmental immunity principles). For an extensive
analysis of intergovernmental immunity, see Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 992–94.
187. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
188. For an extensive analysis of preemption, see Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 981–85.
189. See David S. Rubenstein, Supremacy, Inc., 67 UCLA L. REV. 1130, 1165–68 (2020) (tracing
how federal contracts can operate to displace state law through “preemption by contract”).
190. No. C11-3125LFR, 2013 WL 6474150 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2013).
191. Id. at *2.
192. Id.
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sovereign immunity” defense.193 Our previous work traced how federal
contractors have been turning to sovereign shield defenses to avoid state
law claims for decades.194 We showed that when a private entity under
contract with the federal government engages in illegal behavior that
causes harm, it may seek to exploit the benefits of the sovereign’s
supremacy. A court reviewing the contractor’s defense and applying the
“inverted agency” analysis described above195 assesses whether the
contractor complied with the terms of its contract with the government
and whether the government specifically directed the contractor to operate
in a way that created the risk of the harm that occurred. If the court
concludes that the contractor, as the federal government’s faithful servant,
essentially did what the government told it to do, then the government is
to blame and the contractor will likely enjoy access to the same defenses
that the government, had it directly caused the harm itself, would be able
to claim.196
In Evans v. Mayer Tree Service,197 the plaintiff sued state and federal
entities, along with their private contractors, for impermissible removal of
plaintiff’s trees in connection with the cooperative effort to control an
infestation of the Asian longhorned beetle.198 After a federal court
dismissed the FTCA claim under the discretionary function exception
theory,199 the state court held that the contractor and subcontractor would
not be liable for state torts, relying on derivative sovereign immunity.200
In Carley v. Wheeled Coach,201 an emergency medical technician who was
injured when the ambulance she was riding in flipped over sued the
manufacturer, who had provided the vehicle pursuant to a federal contract
with the United States General Services Administration.202 Citing
extensively to both Boyle and Yearsley, the Third Circuit held that the
government contractor defense applied to both military and nonmilitary
contractors.203 In Carley, the court explained how the FTCA could
193. Id. (first citing Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988); then citing Yearsley v.
W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940)); see also infra section II.A.
194. See Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 978–94.
195. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 1007.
196. See, e.g., Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 20–21 (“[I]t is clear that if this authority to carry out the project
was validly conferred, that is, if what was done was within the constitutional power of Congress, there
is no liability on the part of the contractor for executing its will.”).
197. 162 N.E.3d 70 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020).
198. Id. at 71–72.
199. Evans v. United States, 876 F.3d 375, 384 (1st Cir. 2017).
200. Mayer Tree Service, 162 N.E.3d at 76.
201. 991 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1993).
202. Id. at 1118.
203. Id. at 1120.
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simultaneously offer the federal government immunity in the federal court
action and shelter the private contractor from liability in the state court
action through the government contractor defense. The court relied on the
FTCA’s discretionary function exception for each conclusion, which
worked together to eliminate all of plaintiff’s claims.204 Although the
Carley court left open the final decision due to limited facts, one need
only look to Boyle for an example of the FTCA and the sovereign shield
working together to foreclose all of a plaintiff’s remedies.205
Even where defendant contractors’ sovereign shield defenses are not
ultimately successful, the current confusion and extent of their reach
harms the jurisprudence generally and litigants specifically. In Torres v.
United States Department of Homeland Security,206 for example,
immigrant detainees and legal organizations brought suit challenging
conditions of confinement at two facilities.207 One of the facilities was an
immigration detention facility in San Bernardino County run by The GEO
Group, Inc. (“GEO”) pursuant to its contract with U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).208 In a motion to dismiss, GEO argued
that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because of defenses
sounding in preemption (arguing that the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1252, stripped the court of jurisdiction) and
intergovernmental immunity (arguing that the requested relief could
“enjoin or restrain operation” of the relevant provisions of the INA).209 In
the same motion, however, GEO argued that it was not a state actor and
thus, could not be held liable for constitutional violations.210 In other
words, in the same breath, GEO relied on its relationship with the federal
government to save it from liability, then turned on a dime to renounce
that relationship to save itself from liability.
Even when a contractor is unsuccessful, as GEO was in Torres,211

204. Id. at 1120–23.
205. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 513–14 (1988) (finding that no reasonable
jury could find for the plaintiff where government contractor established government contractor
defense); see also In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 351 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding plaintiffs
could be denied relief for injuries resulting from exposure to emissions from open burn pits where
private federal contractors could rely on the “combatant activities” exception to the FTCA to derive
the benefits of the sovereign’s immunity).
206. 411 F. Supp. 3d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2019).
207. Complaint at 3–4, Torres, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1036 (No. 5:18-cv-02604),
https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/aclu_socal_torres_20181214_complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KS6N-STSK].
208. Id. at 2.
209. See Torres, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 1047, 1050 (order denying motion to dismiss).
210. Id. at 1057.
211. Id.
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simply by claiming a sovereign shield defense, the contractor benefits by
delaying the proceedings, increasing the costs to the plaintiff, and
continuing to benefit from the ongoing government contract.212 Further,
even when a contractor unsuccessfully deploys one or more sovereign
shield defenses in a particular litigation, it is not precluded from seeking
the protection of such doctrines in future cases.213
By creating and building up the multiple doctrinal walls that protect the
federal government and its contractors from liability, the Supreme Court
has left plaintiffs with rights but few remedies.214 In many instances,
plaintiffs injured by federal government contractors have no remedy. This
happens when a defendant contractor is certified as a government
employee, but the substituted government defendant then takes advantage
of one of the FTCA’s wide-ranging immunity waiver exceptions.215 It also
happens when an FTCA claim is thrown out under the “independent
contractor” exception, but a state court later determines that the same
“discretionary function” exemption provides preemptive protection for
the contractor in the state court action.216 It occurs when a Bivens claim is
thrown out on the grounds that a private contractor was the bad actor, and
then the defendant contractor seeks the protection of sovereign shield
212. See Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 1039 (exploring how “[e]ven when contractors lose
their individual battles, confusion and conflation of the sovereign shield doctrines benefit the
government contractors and their agency partners to the detriment of consumers and their state
advocates”); see also Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974) (cataloging advantages that recurrent,
organizational litigants have over infrequent, individual litigants); Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs:
Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its Users, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1369, 1387 (2006) (same); Kathryn
A. Sabbeth, Simplicity as Justice, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 287, 293 (2018) (“Even parties able to retain
counsel may be stymied as the costs of litigation mount. Wealthy parties regularly use discovery
devices and motion practice to make it impossible for less powerful actors to pursue meritorious
claims to conclusion.”).
213. Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 1039–40 (explaining how issue preclusion does not prevent
a contractor from recycling the same arguments in future litigation). And although we are primarily
concerned with cases where the procedural hurdles make it impossible for a plaintiff to achieve redress
from any entity, we note the analytic tension that arises even when the plaintiff can successfully get
damages from a contractor under state law. In a tort action under state law, the individual contractor
employee defendant might well not have to pay damages, as a result of indemnification.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.14 (AM. L. INST. 2006). This is at odds with the Court’s
earlier pronouncement that an entity, as opposed to a natural person, was not a proper defendant under
Bivens. See supra note 115 and accompanying text; see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484–86
(1994).
214. This is not a new problem. See Leah Litman, Remedial Convergence and Collapse, 106 CALIF.
L. REV. 1477, 1480 (2018) (recognizing scholars that “have identified how raising the various
remedial standards has resulted in a kind of remedial collapse, where all of the remedies are
collectively unavailable for the violation . . . of a constitutional right”).
215. See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text (explaining FTCA scenario two).
216. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text (explaining how the FTCA can eliminate
multiple remedial avenues for plaintiffs).
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defenses in a resulting state tort lawsuit.217
In certain circumstances, government actors may even be held
accountable for the same conduct for which their private contractor
partners escape liability. This occurs where the contractor bad actor is
replaced by the United States in an FTCA action. In that circumstance,
any liability lies with the federal government. The contractor employee
and—importantly—the contractor entity escape with no liability or
accountability. The same thing also happens when a federal contractor
would be dismissed under Bivens, but a federal officer would not be. In
that scenario, only the individual government actor may be liable for
constitutional violations. While a separate state court action against the
individual contractor employee could result in tort damages, such a
victory is not guaranteed.
This pattern of pleadings and defenses has also occurred in the military
context where contractors walk away largely unscathed. Consider the
cases arising from the Abu Ghraib torture and prisoner abuse scandal.
Suffering a shortage of military personnel overseas in 2003, the U.S.
government contracted with private U.S. corporations to provide civilian
interrogators and interpreters to work in conjunction with U.S. military
intelligence personnel.218 In mid-2004, shocking evidence surfaced
publicly that Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib had been severely abused.219
Although U.S. military members were criminally prosecuted, leading to
courts-martial and convictions,220 and despite there being public evidence
that the private corporations were involved in the abuse,221 the Department
217. See supra notes 198–203. It is also worth noting that there are practical barriers when a case
originates with federal claims in federal court and is required to refile with state claims in state court.
Procedural barriers like statute of limitations may preclude the second suit.
218. See Major General Antonio M. Taguba, Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation of the 800th
Military Police Brigade 15–16 (2004).
219. Rebecca Leung, Abuse at Abu Ghraib, CBS NEWS (May 5, 2004),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/abuse-at-abu-ghraib/ [https://perma.cc/3BVR-UXTR]; Seymour M.
Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER (Apr. 30, 2004), https://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib [https://perma.cc/DVL7-ZTW9].
220. See, e.g., England Sentenced to 3 Years for Prison Abuse, NBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2005, 10:06
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna9492624 [https://perma.cc/3K28-2LZY] (noting that there
were “nine courts-martial [and various convictions] of low-level soldiers charged in the [Abu Ghraib]
scandal”); Soldier Is Found Guilty in Abu Ghraib Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/17/us/soldier-is-found-guilty-in-abu-ghraib-abuse.html
[https://perma.cc/UA5B-WTWY] (detailing the convictions of soldiers in relation to the abuse of
inmates at Abu Ghraib).
221. See, e.g., Daniel Seiden, CACI Fights ‘Unprecedented’ Abu Ghraib Torture Liability Ruling,
BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 25, 2019, 1:51 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/federalcontracting/unprecedented-ruling-returns-abu-ghraib-case-to-fourth-circuit [https://perma.cc/4XPQV3AD] (detailing the involvement of a private military contractor—CACI Premier Technology Inc.—
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of Justice declined to file criminal charges against the contractor
employees or the contractor entities themselves. Subsequently, hundreds
of Iraqi plaintiffs filed a series of civil lawsuits against these corporations.
Of the three major suits,222 one was settled out of court223 and one was
dismissed on grounds of conflict and field preemption.224 The third
remains precariously pending after many of its claims were dismissed
under various sovereignty defenses as the case moved from district to
appellate courts.225 Because the military exceptions to waivers of
sovereign immunity and the corresponding defenses are uniquely
complex, we leave further analysis in this realm to scholars specializing
in military matters. We note only that the accountability gap between
government actors and their contractors strikes us as improperly balanced.
What, therefore, do we learn from the current state of doctrinal affairs
to account for in crafting our proposed remedy? We take the following
lessons, sketched here and implemented in Part II to follow:
Qualified immunity, as a construct and in the abstract, provides a useful
framework to develop a theory of qualified sovereignty for government
contractors.226
Liability for injuries caused by contractor employees should not stop
with the natural person. Any remedial scheme must provide for liability
of the individual’s employer, the federal contractor, under a theory of
respondeat superior.227
State law, in addition to federal legislation and constitutional law,
should provide a basis for claims against a federal government contractor.
in the operations of suspect activity at Abu Ghraib); Pratap Chatterjee & A.C. Thompson, Private
Contractors and Torture at Abu Ghraib, Iraq, CORPWATCH (May 7, 2004),
https://corpwatch.org/article/private-contractors-and-torture-abu-ghraib-iraq
[https://perma.cc/ECH3-FMKK] (outlining the support staff provided by CACI International, Inc. to
aid in operations at Abu Ghraib).
222. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2009); Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 657 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2011).
223. Al-Quraishi, et al. v. Nakhla and L-3 Services, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Sep. 8, 2021),
https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/al-quraishi-et-al-v-nakhla-and-l-3-services
[https://perma.cc/3ULV-Y45X].
224. See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 16–17.
225. See Al Shimari, 679 F.3d at 210–12 (describing procedural history).
226. The authors of this Article synthesized this lesson from the work of previous scholars. See,
e.g., Schwartz, supra note 139 (identifying the merits of qualified immunity as a framework to analyze
the propriety of imposing liability on the government for harms officials cause); Reinert, supra note
127 (same).
227. For years, scholars have argued that Bivens remedies must apply to entities, rather than just
individuals. See, e.g., Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1558–59 (1972) (arguing that the Court should enable such actions for
damages); Reinert, supra note 127, at 814 n.18 (collecting scholarly works calling for entity
accountability).
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What if immunity were truly contingent? We argue that this constitutes
the proper resolution to the conundrum of liability for private entities that
operate pursuant to a federal contract. Recall that the function of immunity
is to act as a barrier to protect the sovereign from unwarranted liability
that would detract from the ability to achieve lofty goals in service of the
public. A government defendant that acted in good faith and did not
violate a clearly established right has a persuasive claim to some form of
immunity.228
But what of a private actor under contract with the sovereign?
Extension of the sovereign shield to a federal contractor turns on the
contractual relationship: the nature and extent of the contractor’s liability
depend on the association between contractor and sovereign. Thus, if the
sovereign would have enjoyed some form of immunity or benefitted from
federal preemption of state law, then the contractor may lay claim to the
same protection and to the same extent, provided that the contractor
complied with the terms of a lawful contract to engage in lawful
conduct.229 But such strong protection should not be extended when the
action taken would clearly violate a person’s or persons’ rights. We
decline to accept that private entities should derive the benefits of
sovereignty regardless of harms caused or rights violated.
Instead, for a government contractor, we propose “qualified
sovereignty,” an immunity available to that contractor only after meeting
certain conditions. Specifically, we propose that once a plaintiff has
established that a contractor has caused harm in violation of the plaintiff’s
rights,230 the contractor is qualified to seek derivative protection of the
sovereign shield only if (1) the contractor was acting as the government’s
agent, (2) the contractor complied with any guidelines or instructions
given by the government, and (3) it was reasonable for the contractor to
believe that its conduct would not violate legal rights. A private entity
acting pursuant to a federal contract may be entitled to sovereign shield
protections, but not automatically. A contractor should be susceptible to
monetary damages for harms caused by its conduct on behalf of the
federal government if the contractor should have known that its conduct
violated the plaintiff’s legal rights.

228. Consistent with our previous work, we would also limit the application of sovereign shield
defenses to noncommercial conduct. Sovereign in Commerce, supra note 25, at 1128–29.
229. See Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 1004–07.
230. In the context of our prior work, this showing, sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss were
the defendant a private entity unaffiliated with the federal government, would rebut the presumption
of applicability of the sovereign shield. Sovereign in Commerce, supra note 25, at 1142.
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The first two prongs are borrowed from the Yearsley doctrine of
derivative sovereign immunity and are, at their most basic, an agency
analysis.231 The third prong is salvaged from the doctrine of qualified
immunity.232 These are two unlikely sources for components of a “fix”
intended to promote availability of a remedy. As discussed above233 and
in our previous work,234 we have misgivings about the dangerous
consequences of the Court’s repeated moves to expand the scope of
government actor protection and correspondingly to limit the possibilities
of plaintiff recovery. Although the jurisprudence surrounding derivative
sovereign immunity and qualified immunity is replete with problems, our
proposed qualified sovereignty construct differs in four critical ways:
(1) it applies to private actors, rather than government actors; (2) it applies
to entities and is not limited to individuals; (3) it looks to a broad range of
underlying rights violations; and (4) it reimagines qualified immunity’s
“clearly established”235 prong for the private defendant. By specifying the
conditions that must be met before a court may deny a remedy to a victim
wronged by a federal contractor and by expanding the pool of both
plaintiffs and underlying causes of action, our proposal aims to counter
the interpretive moves that the Court has made when applying derivative
sovereign immunity and, to a greater extent, qualified immunity. The
Court’s doctrinal steps have operated in the real world to deny relief to
plaintiffs.
Such a doctrinal modification would open possibilities of recovery for
plaintiffs who, having alleged contractors’ harmful conduct, currently are
blocked by sovereign shield defenses and the application of sovereign
immunity waivers, explained in Part I. Under our proposal, plaintiffs
suing federal contractors would confront sovereign shield defenses only
if the contractor successfully were to lay claim to qualified sovereignty.
If the contractor should reasonably have known that its conduct would
violate a legal right, then the contractor could not hide behind its
relationship with the sovereign to avoid liability. The plaintiff could sue
the private contractor in federal or state court just as it would sue any other
231. Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20–22 (1940); see also Sovereign Shield,
supra note 4, at 987–89 (explaining the Yearsley doctrine).
232. See generally Schwartz, supra note 139 (criticizing the doctrine of qualified immunity). See
also Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Time to Change the Message, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1887, 1888–889 (2018) (describing criticism of Supreme Court’s expansive treatment of qualified
immunity); Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 230–31 (2006)
(describing the difficulty of applying qualified immunity doctrine).
233. See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text.
234. See Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 973–74 (summarizing “challenges posed by the
expansion of the sovereign shield”).
235. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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private entity. Here we seek to expand an injured plaintiff’s access to
monetary remedies for currently uncompensated injuries.
This objective could be achieved in other ways, too. For example, if the
federal legislature were to act toward the same goal by redefining the
extent of sovereign shield defenses available to contractors, we would
embrace that result as well.
A.

Borrowing from Yearsley

This theory of qualified sovereignty is informed by derivative
sovereign immunity, which allows a nonfederal actor to exploit
perquisites of sovereignty, provided certain conditions are met.236 To
determine whether a contractor is entitled to such immunity, reviewing
courts consider the existence of the relationship between contractor and
sovereign, the degree of specificity of instructions given the contractor by
the sovereign,237 and the degree of the contractor’s compliance with those
instructions.238 The idea is clear: the greater the sovereign’s responsibility
for the conduct that caused harm, the stronger the contractor’s claim to
any derivative sovereign liability protections. The Supreme Court
explained this in Yearsley, in which the Court held that a private company,
under contract with the federal government, was not liable under an
eminent domain theory because its actions were undertaken pursuant to
the contract.239 Where the government authorized the contractor’s action
and the authority was validly conferred by Congress, the Court held that
“there is no liability on the part of the contractor for executing [the
government’s] will.”240 Courts have looked to the 1940 Yearsley decision
as the seminal case on derivative sovereign immunity.241
As a threshold matter, therefore, our proposal for qualified sovereignty
requires that a contractor establish that the necessary relationship with the
federal government existed, that the contractor complied with the
contract’s terms, and that the conduct that caused harm was specified or

236. Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 986.
237. Id. at 989.
238. Id. at 1006.
239. Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20–22 (1940).
240. Id.
241. Courts have used different terms for application of the Yearsley doctrine, including “derivative
sovereign immunity,” In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 343 (4th Cir. 2014), and “shared
immunity,” Portis v. Folk Constr. Co., 694 F.2d 520, 524 (8th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court has
seemingly embraced the notion of “immunity” as applied to the Yearsley doctrine. See CampbellEwald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 159–60 (2016).
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required by the contract.242 This would be a prerequisite step in the
analysis but would not be dispositive in the determination of the
availability of sovereign shield defenses.
This turn to Yearsley as step one of asserting qualified sovereignty is
critical to our proposal. As the above discussion explains, with respect to
qualified immunity, a defendant officer arguing that they exercised
discretion in committing the harmful act may evade liability in order to
provide officials “breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken
judgments about open legal questions.”243 Further, FTCA exceptions,
including the “discretionary function” exception, can provide the requisite
path to preemption under Boyle.244 Intuitively, these doctrinal conclusions
make little sense: in a discretionary zone, doctrine should incentivize an
official to act with more, rather than less, concern for the rights and safety
of the potentially vulnerable party. Further, it starkly contrasts to
traditional agency analysis invoked in Yearsley and in other contexts to
determine whether an agent is liable alone or alongside a principal.245
Under the qualified sovereignty construct, a federal contractor could not
claim the benefits of the sovereign shield if it exercised discretion in
committing the alleged bad act.
Although the Court suggested in Richardson v. McKnight that private
companies working for the government are subject to market incentives
to do a good job (and the possible availability of the sovereign shield
undermines any such incentive),246 in reality, there may be few rivals to
any one contractor seeking federal business. Relatively few companies
have competed to operate federal prison facilities, for example.247 Thus
market pressure may be insufficient to provide an incentive to respect the
rights of others, to ensure that the contractor and its employees look out
for those who are vulnerable to its misconduct or negligence. For that
reason, qualified sovereignty focuses on entities, not just natural persons.

242. In our prior work, we argue that recovery should be possible for the plaintiff if the conduct
that caused harm was commercial in nature, Sovereign in Commerce, supra note 25, at 1145–46.
Therefore, if our vision were implemented in full, a contractor defendant could not invoke qualified
sovereignty at all if the alleged bad action was commercial. For further explanation, see infra
section III.C.
243. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011).
244. See supra notes 56, 184–187.
245. See Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 1007 (explaining the “inverted agency” analysis used
by courts to determine whether a contractor defendant enjoys the protection of the doctrines available
to prevent suits against the sovereign).
246. 521 U.S. 399, 410–12 (1997).
247. See MEGAN MUMFORD, DIANE WHITMORE SCHANZENBACH & RYAN NUNN, HAMILTON
PROJECT, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PRISONS 3 (2016) (finding that the three largest private prison
companies account for 96% of all private prison beds).
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The idea is that the prospect of liability should (1) lead contractors to
control their employees’ behavior; (2) lead contractors to push back on
federal guidelines that threaten clear violations of individual rights; and
(3) ensure true access to remedies for individuals harmed by contractor
conduct by holding contractors liable for their agents’ and employees’
conduct under principles of respondeat superior.
B.

Salvaging from Qualified Immunity

The first part of qualified sovereignty is the agency prong; the second
part is the reasonableness prong. The defendant contractor bears the
burden of proof for both prongs. Once a defendant contractor establishes
the necessary relationship with the federal government, it would then need
to establish that it was reasonable for the contractor to believe that its
conduct would not violate the plaintiff’s legal rights.
If a plaintiff shows that a federal contractor violated a constitutionally
protected right by detaining a civilian,248 for example, that contractor
would then have to establish that it was reasonable for the contractor to
believe that its course of conduct in implementing the contract would not
violate a legal right. This standard would require the contractor to bear the
burden of establishing that the failure to anticipate a legal violation was
reasonable on the facts available and given the terms of the contract.
The argument here is not for blanket adoption of the qualified immunity
test as developed by the Court. Critics have severely undermined that
jurisprudence, as noted above,249 and we recognize that too often in
practice it may function as a real or perceived bar to suit.250 Instead, we
propose that once a plaintiff shows that the harm suffered is the result of
a violation of a right protected by law, the burden is on the contractor
defendant to show not merely that its conduct was not incompetent but
that it was reasonable for the contractor to believe its conduct would not
violate the plaintiff’s rights.
The reasonableness prong of the analysis borrows from the torts

248. See, e.g., Zuneska v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 338 F. Supp. 3d 102, 111 (2018) (registered sex
offender filed § 1983 action against County and contractor hired by county to “verify” his address,
alleging violations of First Amendment right to privacy and Fourth Amendment right to be “free from
unreasonable seizures”).
249. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 139, at 6 (arguing that the “United States Supreme Court
appears to be on a mission to curb civil rights lawsuits against law enforcement officers, and appears
to believe qualified immunity is the means of achieving its goal”).
250. Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 391 (S.D. Miss. 2020) (order granting qualified
immunity) (observing that the “doctrine is called ‘qualified immunity’ . . . [but] [i]n real life it
operates like absolute immunity”).
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context.251 In that context, “reasonable person” is “a person exercising
those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence and judgment which
society requires of its members for the protection of their own interests
and the interests of others.”252 This standard gives some flexibility and
looks to a community standard, rather than an individual, subjective
standard.253 Our proposal, invoking this definition of reasonableness,
differs from the “clearly established” analysis invoked in modern
qualified immunity doctrine in two ways.
First, the current qualified immunity doctrine requires not simply that
the right be clearly established (e.g., the Eighth Amendment right to be
free of “cruel and unusual punishments”254) but also that the fact that the
official’s particular conduct clearly violated that right (e.g., binding a
non-violent pregnant woman’s hands and feet with zip ties, then tripping
her, causing a miscarriage is a violation of the Eighth Amendment).255
This is why some scholars have noted that the “clearly established” prong
of qualified immunity leaves creative, innovative, or just novel rights
violations unremedied.256
Our approach to “reasonableness” requires only that the right be
reasonably known to the contractor and avoids the particularized fact
inquiry. This approach aligns with early analysis of the qualified
immunity doctrine, where the courts assessed “clearly established” law at
a higher level of abstraction.257 For example, if a reasonable contractor,
accounting for the circumstances of the contract and work, believes that it
would be negligent to operate a vaccination site in violation of Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”) and manufacturing standards with a

251. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 11 (AM. L. INST. 1934) (explaining that the
words “‘reasonably believes’ are used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the fact
that the actor believes that a given fact or combination of facts exist and that the circumstances which
he knows, or should know, are such as to cause a reasonable man so to believe”).
252. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1965) (defining the
standard by which negligence is determined in tort law).
253. Id. cmt. c.
254. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
255. See Nelson v. Corr. Med. Serv., 583 F.3d 522, 524–25 (8th Cir. 2009); F. Andrew Hessick &
Katherine C. Richardson, Qualified Immunity Laid Bare, 56 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 501, 537–38
(2021) (defining the historical and modern approaches to qualified immunity and arguing that the
doctrine has evolved in a way that no longer balances the competing principles for which it was
established).
256. Schwartz, supra note 139, at 61–62 (describing the risk that plaintiffs with valid claims might
not pursue them in light of the difficulty of showing that the “conduct at issue has . . . been clearly
established by prior cases”).
257. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562–65 (1978); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
524 (1985).
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misbranded drug,258 it would not be necessary to show as well that a prior
court had found a vaccination site operator negligent in the exact same
particularized circumstances. That a reasonable contractor would believe
the action would violate state tort law would be sufficient on its own to
prohibit the contractor from invoking the protections of the sovereign
shield.
Second, in application of qualified immunity in the last thirty or forty
years, the Court has increasingly prioritized the rights of government
officials over the rights of the injured citizen. It has done this by
eliminating the original requirement that the government official act in
good faith259 and has turned “a reasonable person” standard into a “no
reasonable officer” standard.260 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,261 in 1982, the
Court held that “government officials performing discretionary functions
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”262 As the
doctrine developed, however, “a reasonable person” for purposes of
qualified immunity analysis became a single reasonable person. This is
clear where, twenty years later, the Court turned the qualified immunity
analysis around, holding that a government official’s conduct clearly
violated the law only when “every ‘reasonable official would [have
understood] that what he is doing violates that right.’”263 Such a shift in
orientation leads to the Court’s conclusion that qualified immunity
“protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law.’”264 Our proposal rejects that approach. Instead, it proposes that
the sovereign shield be unavailable if a reasonable contractor, in
contradistinction to every reasonable contractor, should have known the

258. See infra section III.A.
259. See Hessick & Richardson, supra note 255, at 517–18 (explaining that Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982), abandoned the good faith requirement for qualified immunity in favor of a
doctrine that was concerned about pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs to the officers of facing legal
actions).
260. Id. at 511.
261. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
262. Id. at 818.
263. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
264. Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). The Justices clarified the
implications of this rule in Ziglar v. Abbasi. 528 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017) (“[I]f a
reasonable officer might not have known for certain that the conduct was unlawful[,] then the officer
is immune.”).
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contours of the right—a subtle, though powerful, difference.265
Nor are the relevant rights for purposes of qualified sovereignty limited
to constitutional rights. Contractors who violate state or federal statutory
rights, state or federal constitutionally protected rights,266 or rights in the
shadows of those constitutionally protected rights, may lose the
protections of the sovereign shield. The breadth of coverage, meaning the
range of rights assured possibility of a remedy, should lead the contractors
to think through the implications and possible effects of their manner of
performance, a point to which we return below. Thus, one benefit of
recognizing a broad range of rights that might give rise to liability is
deterrence: the specter of liability should encourage the contractor or
potential contractor to decline to take on certain tasks if the necessary
activities might create risk of significant financial liabilities to the
business.
It is possible, even probable in some lines of business, that the prospect
of expanded liability may lead private entities to shy away from
performing services that they were previously willing to provide for the
government because of the increased liability risk. We regard this
correction as a benefit rather than a flaw. The contractor’s changed
assessment implies that performance was previously profitable because of
the availability of the sovereign shield, meaning that protection from
liability constituted an unbargained-for benefit to the business at the
expense of the taxpayer. Such changes in business strategy may also offer
a market-based response to the question of the optimal degree of reliance
on the private sector to perform ostensibly public work, with the choices
of business leaders highlighting the judgment call to be made when our
proposed, modified liability regime compels internalization of costs of
harms.
We limit our qualified sovereignty proposal to private entities working
under contract with the federal government. Extending it to the
government itself would sharply weaken the notion of sovereign
immunity. Although there have been compelling calls to do just that,267
265. But cf. Hessick & Richardson, supra note 255, at 522 (recognizing that the change in phrasing
“suggests a substantial strengthening of qualified immunity,” but also noting that the “true
significance of this change is unclear”).
266. We recognize that applying a federal standard to assess the clarity of state law could introduce
possible federalism concerns. We do not take those up in this project.
267. Federal sovereign immunity does not find explicit origin in the Constitution. See Vicki C.
Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 522 (2003) (arguing that “the constitutional provenance of federal
‘sovereign immunity’ is obscure, and was a matter of genuine uncertainty in early years”); Katherine
Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law, “Accident,” and Policy in the Development
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we continue to recognize the rationale behind sovereign immunity—
protecting common resources and public tax dollars, sustaining separation
of powers, and protecting the government from undue interference.268
Perversely, under current sovereign immunity waivers, including the
Federal Tort Claims Act and the Bivens doctrine, which we have discussed
above,269 the federal government and its employees may face greater
direct accountability than private contractors engaged in the same bad
behavior. One benefit of our solution is that it corrects this imbalance.
Our approach to the availability of the sovereign shield defenses further
ensures both that the pool of potentially liable defendants is larger and the
likelihood of such a defendant having to pay damages or otherwise
respond for injuries inflicted is greater. In suggesting that this is
normatively desirable, we do not intend to argue that there is an optimal
probability of defendant liability; we do, however, contend any selection
of a normative baseline demands an adequate justification. Thus,
advocates of expanding limits on liability of federal contractors bear the
of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765, 776–77 (2008) (describing sovereign
immunity as a “mystery” and noting that “[f]ederal sovereign immunity is not mentioned in the
Constitution and was not explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court until 1821”). Although it
remains a well-established doctrine, see Pornomo v. United States, 814 F.3d 681, 687 (4th Cir. 2016)
(“[T]he default position is that the federal government is immune to suit.”); Lipsey v. United States,
879 F.3d 249, 253 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he United States as sovereign is immune from suit unless it
has consented to be sued.”); Evans v. United States, 876 F.3d 375, 380 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. denied,
__ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 81 (2018) (“[T]he United States is immune from suit without its consent.”),
scholars have argued for its limitation or elimination. See, e.g., Jackson, supra, at 607–08; Edwin M.
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1924) (arguing that because “many states
have not yet granted such consent and since those that have, have so qualified it as to exclude
practically all cases of liability for tort, it is proper to show that the reasons which once may have
been deemed to justify the public policy of immunity from suit and responsibility do not in fact today prevail”); Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 37
(1926) (asserting that “none of the grounds advanced for the sovereign immunity, historical or
theoretical, can today command serious respect or be regarded as convincing”); Clark Byse, Proposed
Reforms in Federal “Nonstatutory” Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties,
Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1479, 1484 (1962) (arguing that the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
among others, has “operated to deny or unreasonably hinder judicial review of federal administrative
action”); Roger C. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for
Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68
MICH. L. REV. 387, 391 (1970) (calling for the “elimination of the doctrine of sovereign immunity as
a barrier to judicial review of federal administrative action”).
268. Randall S. Abate & Carolyn H. Cogswell, Sovereign Immunity and Citizen Enforcement of
Federal Environmental Laws: A Proposal for a New Synthesis, 15 VA. ENV’T L.J. 1, 4–5 (1995);
David A. Webster, Beyond Federal Sovereign Immunity: 5 U.S.C.§ 702 Spells Relief, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 725, 727 (1988). But see Fallon, supra note 102, at 940 (arguing that “the historical accident of
sovereign immunity—extended to governments on a categorical basis, without regard to the interests
or exigencies at stake in particular cases—lacks a defensible normative rationale”). Consistent with
our prior work, we would limit application of sovereign immunity to noncommercial conduct. See
Sovereign in Commerce, supra note 25, at 1142.
269. See supra Part I.
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burden of justifying that shift, as well as the Court’s past decisions that
expanded the scope of the immunity and preemption doctrines. The
doctrinal movement in this as in other contexts270 has reduced the
possibility of obtaining a remedy, at the expense of victims, and it is far
from clear that any of the rationales offered by the Court in support of
their ever-more-robust interpretations of the doctrine actually provide
adequate justification.271 Moreover, the values we seek to vindicate are
not radical, though they may be out-of-step with a majority of the Justices:
we begin with the simple premise that those whose rights are violated by
private parties deserve a remedy.272 Explicitly extending sovereign
immunity only to federal contractors that can satisfy the conditions of
qualified sovereignty, as set forth above, would expand the set of
circumstances under which plaintiffs injured by contractor conduct may
recover. This is the goal: to make more parties currently benefiting from
a form of derivative immunity unable to turn to its protections when
citizens’ rights have been violated. While this reform would not ensure
recovery in all circumstances, it improves upon current doctrine. And as
noted above, should critics of sovereign immunity,273 qualified
immunity,274 or FTCA exceptions275 prevail on Congress or the Court to
modify statutes or doctrines and thus broaden access to redress, our
qualified sovereignty construct could be modified to follow suit. We fear,
however, that neither such legislative nor judicial moves are likely. In the
next Part, we illustrate how qualified sovereignty would work.
III. ILLUSTRATION: QUALIFYING SOVEREIGNTY
The case for adoption of our qualified sovereignty construct to this
point has necessarily been abstract. In this Part, we illustrate how a court

270. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2010) (describing the Supreme Court’s “continued
retreat from the principles of citizen access, private enforcement of public policies, and equality of
litigant treatment in favor of corporate interests and concentrated wealth”).
271. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 139, at 18 (decrying the lack of empirical evidence supporting
the Court’s reasoning that in the absence of a robust qualified immunity defense, government actors
would be subject to the “burdens of discovery and trial”).
272. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397
(stating that “‘[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury’”) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
273. See generally Jackson, supra note 267 (cataloging the failures of sovereign immunity to
remedy harms for injured plaintiffs).
274. See generally Schwartz, supra note 139 (identifying deficiencies in qualified immunity in
providing a remedy to injured parties).
275. See generally Niles, supra note 38 (critiquing the FTCA and its exceptions as overly broad).
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could implement our proposal in the context of the facts of an actual case.
The first section below describes the litigation we offer as a case study,
while the second section outlines how a court would weigh arguments if
qualified sovereignty were available. The third section puts qualified
sovereignty in the context of our prior work on the proper scope of
sovereign immunity.
A.

Anthrax Vaccine—The Case

In Ammend v. BioPort, Inc.,276 a group of several dozen former military
personnel, along with their families, sued for damages related to their
receipt of an anthrax vaccine (“AVA”).277 The vaccinations were directed
as part of the United States Department of Defense (“DoD”) mass
vaccination directive issued on November 26, 1993, and the 1997 Anthrax
Vaccination Immunization Program.278 The vaccine was not voluntary,
and soldiers who refused were disciplined.279 Subsequent studies linked
the AVA to Gulf War Syndrome, birth defects, hypersensitivity
pneumonia, gastroparesis, optic neuritis, life threatening allergic
reactions, fatigue, sleep disturbance, Crohn’s disease, multiple sclerosis,
and asthma.280
Plaintiffs sued BioPort, Inc. (“BioPort”), which allegedly
manufactured, designed, distributed, produced, and sold AVA pursuant to
an exclusive contract with DoD,281 two state government entities that were
BioPort’s predecessors,282 and Dr. Robert C. Myers, a doctor of veterinary
medicine and the Chief Operating Officer and principal owner of
BioPort.283 The plaintiffs asserted that defendants misrepresented the side
effects of the vaccine,284 ran the AVA facility without complying with
necessary Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and manufacturing
standards,285 misbranded the drug,286 and changed the production process
without FDA approval.287 Plaintiffs further alleged that they were

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

322 F. Supp. 2d 848 (W.D. Mich. 2004).
Id. at 852–53.
Complaint at ¶¶ 99, 105, Ammend, 322 F. Supp. 2d 848 (No. 5:03-CV-031).
Id. ¶ 119.
Id. ¶¶ 150–53.
Id. ¶ 78.
Id. ¶¶ 79–80.
Id. ¶ 81.
Id. ¶¶ 100, 115, 121.
Id. ¶¶ 102, 132, 142.
Id. ¶¶ 123, 141.
Id. ¶ 126.
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inoculated by one of the negligently manufactured lots of AVA288 and
suffered injury.289 For example, plaintiff Mark Ammend, a fifty-three
year-old Air Force fire chief, alleged that, prior to his AVA inoculation,
he was in very good health.290 After his four AVA inoculations, Mark
“suffered from chronic fatigue and memory loss, as well as serious muscle
loss and cognitive problems.”291 Within a month of his final vaccination,
“Mark was in a wheelchair.”292 Another plaintiff, Sarah Berdugo, a
twenty-eight-year-old Air Force Captain, was in “excellent health” prior
to receiving her inoculations.293 After her AVA vaccinations, Sarah
“suffered from uterine bleeding, fever, migraines, skin sensitivities,
nausea, joint pain, weight loss, skin rash, smell sensitivities, decreased
libido, and gastrointestinal problems.”294 Seventy-five others alleged
similar injuries, up to and including death.295 In light of such injuries,
Plaintiffs alleged violations of state and federal law, including negligence,
breach of warranties, breach of the right to be treated with essential human
dignity, strict products liability, fraud, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
violations, and loss of consortium.296
Each of the defendants sought summary judgment to dismiss plaintiffs’
claims.297 In a lengthy opinion, the district court granted the two state
defendants summary judgment under a theory of sovereign immunity298
but denied summary judgment to BioPort and Dr. Myers because the facts
were insufficient to justify a finding of immunity for those parties.299 The
court did analyze BioPort’s assertion that it was entitled to the protection
of the sovereign shield. BioPort asserted that “[t]he government contractor
defense provides an affirmative defense to state tort liability by extending

288. Id. ¶ 149.
289. Id. ¶¶ 161–63, 172–73, 180–81, 189, 198–99, 208–09, 218–19, 228–29, 238–39, 248–49,
257–58, 265–66, 274–75, 284–85, 294, 303–04, 313, 319, 324–26, 333–34, 342–43, 352–53, 360,
369–70, 379–80, 386–87, 395–96, 406–07, 417–18, 428–29, 436–37, 445–46, 455–56, 462–64, 473–
74, 483–84, 492–93, 502–03, 511–12, 521–22, 531–32, 541, 549–50, 558–59, 568–69, 578–79, 587–
88, 597, 606–07, 614–15, 621, 630–31, 639–41, 649–50, 657, 666, 674–75, 684–85, 693–94, 699–
701, 706–07, 715–16, 722, 729–31, 738–40, 746–47, 755–59, 765–66, 772–75, 783–84, 793, 799–
803, 808–11, 815–17, 825, 832–36, 843.
290. Id. ¶¶ 155–56, 160.
291. Id. ¶ 161.
292. Id. ¶¶ 158, 162.
293. Id. ¶¶ 202–03, 207.
294. Id. ¶ 208.
295. See supra note 289.
296. Id. ¶¶ 845–922.
297. Ammend, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 854.
298. Id. at 855–56.
299. Id. at 864, 877–79.
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the sovereign immunity of the United States to contractors who
manufacture products for the federal government.”300 The court initially
punted on the issue, noting that there was insufficient evidence to show
that BioPort met the requirements of Boyle immunity.301
BioPort subsequently asserted that it was entitled to complete
immunity under the government contractor defense.302 It spent more than
twelve pages of its brief explaining why it was entitled to this Boyle
immunity.303 Dr. Myers also asserted the government contractor defense,
relying on BioPort’s briefing to make his case.304 The court found that Dr.
Myers was entitled to immunity based on his role in the corporate entity
and that BioPort was entitled to assert the government contractor
defense.305 The court also found that BioPort manufactured AVA
according to DoD’s precise specifications, that AVA was manufactured
in conformance with DoD standards, and that DoD was aware of the risks
and dangers associated with AVA and BioPort’s facilities.306 This,
according to the court, met the standard for a government contractor
defense under Boyle, precluding a state law claim against BioPort and
enabling the company to avoid liability.307
B.

Anthrax Vaccine—Qualified Sovereignty

If the reviewing court were to implement our proposal of qualified
sovereignty, would anything in the Anthrax case change? Upon plaintiffs’
showing that BioPort’s actions violated their legal rights, BioPort could
assert a qualified sovereignty defense. To qualify for this sovereign shield
protection, BioPort would need to establish: (1) it was acting as the
government’s agent; (2) it complied with any guidelines established by
the government; and (3) it was reasonable for the contractor to believe that
its conduct would not violate legal rights.
Based on the information in the pleadings and opinions, it seems likely
that BioPort could establish that it was acting as DoD’s agent. For
example, the court found that a “DoD official characterized BioPort as a
300. Id. at 877.
301. Id. at 877–79.
302. Id. at 877; see Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 987–92, for a thorough explanation of Boyle
and its relationship to Yearsley.
303. BioPort’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 42–54, Ammend, 322 F. Supp. 2d 848 (No. 5:03CV-031).
304. Motion of Dr. Robert C. Myers for Summary Judgment at 15, Ammend, 322 F. Supp. 2d 848
(No. 5:03-CV-031).
305. Ammend, No. 1:03-CV-254, 2006 WL 1050509, at *2, *5 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 19, 2006).
306. Id. at *4.
307. Id.
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‘GOCO,’ meaning a ‘government owned, contractor operated’
organization.”308 It is also likely that BioPort could establish that it
complied with the guidelines established by the government. The court
determined as much, holding that “BioPort manufactured AVA according
to the DoD’s very precise specifications” and that BioPort and its
predecessors “manufactured AVA in conformity with the DoD’s
standards.”309 Because these first two prongs mirror the prongs of
derivative sovereign immunity, the Ammend court addressed them
specifically.
Qualified sovereignty would add an additional, and final, step. It would
require BioPort to show that it was reasonable for it to believe that its
conduct would not violate legal rights. The parties did not brief this, of
course, and the court did not take this up, but we can at least set forth the
process. The court would have to consider whether BioPort’s actions, as
alleged in the complaint, violated federal law (here, the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act310) and/or state law (here, state tort law). Taking
into account the legal rights inscribed in those statutes and common law,
the court would need to determine whether BioPort reasonably should
have anticipated that its conduct would violate any of those rights. For
example, the court would appropriately ask whether the company was
aware of the risk of harm and the risk that causing such harm would
violate rights recognized by law. Should a court determine that BioPort’s
actions were not reasonable, then BioPort would not qualify for sovereign
shield defenses, and the action would not be thrown out on Boyle
immunity grounds. The plaintiffs could proceed against BioPort without
getting derailed by sovereign shield defenses.
In addition to increasing potential avenues to remedy for those harmed,
this additional step creates an incentive that did not previously exist.
Knowing that it might be liable for injuries caused by its violations of law
should make BioPort approach both contract negotiations with DoD and
implementation of the contract differently. The parties in this case already
had significant bargaining power in the contract negotiation; BioPort and
its predecessors successfully negotiated an indemnity agreement with
DoD.311 Had BioPort been less sure of its access to sovereign shield
defenses, it might have: (1) negotiated differently with the DoD; (2) taken
more care in its implementation of the contract; and/or (3) resisted
contractual terms that called for conduct that created a significant risk of

308.
309.
310.
311.

Id. (quoting BioPort’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 303, at 25).
Id.
21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i.
Complaint at ¶ 109, Ammend, 322 F. Supp. 2d 848 (No. 5:03-CV-031).
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harm.
C.

Anthrax Vaccine—A Complete Picture of the Project

For readers of our previous writing who are interested in what would
happen if a court were to adopt the series of proposals and protocols
outlined over the course of three Articles,312 this section applies our ideas
to the Ammend case.
In our first Article, we set out our serious normative concerns about the
current state of the law, with respect to the sovereign shield and its
application to private federal contractors.313 Because we are committed to
opening avenues for injured parties to recover, we then argued in our
second article that courts should assess sovereign shield availability based
on the challenged action, rather than on the identity of the actor and that
actor’s relationship with the sovereign.314 We argued that, based on
longstanding doctrinal analysis, courts should first determine if the
challenged conduct was commercial.315 If the court finds that the
challenged action was commercial, then neither the government actor nor
its contractor should be entitled to assert sovereign shield defenses to
avoid monetary judgment.316 If the court finds that the action was not
commercial, then the government should be entitled to relevant sovereign
shield protections.317 Further, we proposed that a federal contractor should
enjoy a presumption that sovereign shield defenses are available unless
the contractor was acting either outside the scope of or in violation of its
duties under contract.318 We offered a protocol for courts to assess
sovereign shield availability based on the commercial/noncommercial
distinction.319 Finally, in this Article, we addressed the scope of liability
for noncommercial action undertaken by private entities under contract
with the federal government.
What would have happened in the Ammend v. BioPort litigation had
the court adopted the scheme that we set forth across all three Articles?
Remember that the several dozen former military personnel and their
families charged that the company violated state and federal laws in the

312. Sovereign Shield, supra note 4; Sovereign in Commerce, supra note 25. The final Article is
this one.
313. Sovereign Shield, supra note 4.
314. Sovereign in Commerce, supra note 25, at 1108.
315. Id. at 1152–55.
316. Id. at 1146.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1142–52.
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development, implementation, and sale of the anthrax vaccine.320 Recall
too that BioPort undertook these actions pursuant to its contract with the
United States Department of Defense.321
First, the court would have asked whether Congress unambiguously
preempted state law or provided immunity for the challenged conduct. If
so, the plaintiffs’ claims would have been dismissed.322 In this case,
BioPort made no mention of preemption in its lengthy explanation of why
it was entitled to Boyle immunity,323 even though Boyle is often
considered a case involving preemption rather than derivative sovereign
immunity.324 Therefore, it is a safe assumption that Congress did not
unambiguously preempt state law claims legislatively.325 In this case, a
preemption inquiry would not alter the outcome; if it could have, the
defendants would have tried it.
Second, the court would consider whether the alleged bad act was
commercial.326 To determine the answer to the commercial question, the
court would have posed the following set of questions: (1) do private
sector actors offer vaccination services or products in competition with
the federal government or its contractor; (2) do individual consumers
engage in direct transactions with BioPort; (3) does a state or federal
consumer protection regulatory regime apply to similar vaccination
products and services not involving the government; and (4) would the
vaccination development and implementation be provided but for federal
intervention?327 If the conduct was commercial, then plaintiffs asserting a
violation of their rights could proceed to the merits of the action against
BioPort and/or the Department of Defense itself. In other words, in the
commercial context, sovereign immunity would not block the plaintiffs’
path. That is because, absent sovereign immunity, the plaintiffs would not
be forced to establish a waiver of that immunity.
These four questions may be difficult to answer in the anthrax
vaccination case. We would expect to see a hard-fought battle, with the
plaintiffs arguing that the conduct was commercial and the defendant
arguing that the conduct was not commercial. That is because, under our

320. See supra notes 276–278, 284–288.
321. See supra note 281.
322. See Sovereign in Commerce, supra note 25, at 1143–45.
323. See supra notes 302–305.
324. See Sovereign Shield, supra note 4, at 980.
325. It is worth pausing here to note that our proposal leaves in place Congress’s right to preempt
unambiguously or to assign immunity explicitly to protect specific conduct, but we reject the notion
of obstacle preemption as a barrier to liability. Sovereign in Commerce, supra note 25, at 1143–44.
326. Id. at 1145–46.
327. Id. at 1145.
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proposed protocol, if the reviewing court concluded that the harmful
conduct was commercial, both DoD and BioPort could be liable. But if
the conduct was not commercial, DoD could lay claim to the perquisites
of sovereignty directly and BioPort could do so derivatively, as the
government’s contractor and agent.
If the court were to determine that BioPort’s challenged conduct was
commercial, then it would look to basic agency principles to determine
whether both the defendant contractor and its principal, DoD, could be
held liable under respondeat superior. The general rule is that “[u]nless an
applicable statute provides otherwise, an actor remains subject to liability
although the actor acts as an agent or an employee, with actual or apparent
authority, or within the scope of employment.”328 Based on assertions
made by BioPort about how the AVA operation ran, it is likely the court
would find the company an agent of the federal government.329 Under our
proposed protocol, then, the plaintiff could proceed against both the
government principal (DoD) and the contractor agent (BioPort) without
confronting sovereign shield defenses. In other words, absent other
jurisdictional concerns, the case could proceed to the merits against both
government and contractor. In Figure 1, below, the case would fall into
the top left quadrant.
Figure 1

Commercial
conduct

Noncommercial
conduct

Joint liability under
agency law
Contractor agent may be
liable

No joint liability under
agency law
Contractor may be liable

Government principal
may be liable
Sovereign shield applies

Contractor may be liable

If, however, the court were to find that Bioport’s actions were not
commercial, BioPort would qualify to seek the protections of the

328. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
329. If the court determined that there would there be joint liability for the government and BioPort
under agency law, perhaps because BioPort did not comply with the terms of its agreement with the
DoD, then the plaintiffs could proceed to the merits of the action against BioPort. This would be true
regardless of whether the underlying conduct was commercial or noncommercial.
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sovereign shield. First, BioPort would have to show an agency
relationship with the federal government. More specifically, the court
would question whether the alleged bad action was taken within the scope
of that agency relationship and pursuant to direction from the federal
principal. In this case, BioPort made a compelling argument to the court
that both were true.330 At that point, a court would move on to the final
question: was it reasonable for the contractor to believe that its conduct
would not violate legal rights? This is a fact-specific inquiry, where the
court would ask: should the reasonable contractor have anticipated that
the course of conduct to be embarked upon in fulfillment of the contract
could cause harm in violation of rights protected by law? If the answer to
that question is no, then BioPort should be able to assert sovereign shield
defenses, including Boyle immunity, pursuant to inverted agency.331 If,
however, the court finds that BioPort should have anticipated that its
actions would violate state or federal law, then it would not be entitled to
derive the benefits of the sovereign shield. Importantly, this means that
BioPort could not assert a claim based on derived sovereign immunity,
derived intergovernmental immunity, or obstacle preemption. Absent
other jurisdictional concerns, plaintiffs’ case would proceed to the merits
against BioPort.
CONCLUSION
Private entities perform an incredible quantity and variety of tasks for
the federal government. In doing that work, these contractors sometimes
cause harm. In this Article, we propose a new doctrinal approach to
considering whether and how contractors’ relationship with their federal
government partner can protect them from liability for those harms. We
propose that private entities operating under contract with the federal
government should be permitted to derive supremacy protections based
on their relationship with the sovereign only if they qualify for such
protections. This proposal thus preserves the possibility of a remedy for
victims of harms inflicted by contractors that otherwise and under current
doctrine enjoy unjustified and unjustifiable impunity.

330. Ammend v. BioPort, Inc., No. 1:03-CV-254, 2006 WL 1050509, at *3–4 (W.D. Mich. Apr.
19, 2006).
331. See Sovereign in Commerce, supra note 25, at 1147–52. This is more fully explored in
section III.B, supra.

